Whistleblowing refers to the disclosure by organization members of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action. Most studies on the topic have been conducted in North American or European private sector organizations, and less attention has been paid to regions such as Turkey. In this study, we study the whistleblowing intentions and channel choices of Turkish employees in private and public sector organizations. Using data from 327 private sector and 405 public (...) sector employees, we find that public sector employees are more idealistic and less inclined to whistleblow externally and anonymously. Higher idealism among public sector employees does not moderate these effects. We find that private sector employees are more relativistic, and that they are more inclined to whistleblow through external and anonymous channels. More relativistic private sector employees are more likely to prefer external whistleblowing; however sector does not moderate the propensity to whistleblow anonymously. (shrink)

Professional institutions are increasingly confronted by fiscal constraints and political pressures to improve and increase their accountability in a competitive consumer-driven market. Accordingly, the need to ensure efficiency and accountability is of strategic importance. This article reports on a qualitative study of medical professionals that assessed the utility of financial incentives and external control methods derived from agency theory to ensure accountability of professionals. The authors argue that approaches derived from stewardship and institutional theories can extend the principal–agent perspective to (...) sustain greater social and ethical accountability. (shrink)

Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted with (...) the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy. Although not necessarily unlawful, their behaviour is politically wrong qua corrupt when it contradicts surreptitiously the requirement of public justification that undergirds the public order. Then, we distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience. (shrink)