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  1. ‘I Do Not Cognize Myself Through Being Conscious of Myself as Thinking’: Self-Knowledge and the Irreducibility of Self-Objectification in Kant.Thomas Khurana - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):956-979.
    The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the (...)
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  • The Parity and Disparity Between Inner and Outer Experience in Kant.Katharina Kraus - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):171-195.
  • Kant’s “I Think” and the Agential Approach to Self-Knowledge.Houston Smit - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):980-1011.
    ABSTRACTThis paper relates Kant’s account of pure apperception to the agential approach to self-knowledge. It argues that his famous claim ‘The I think must be able to accompany all of my represent...
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  • Transcendental Self and the Feeling of Existence.Apaar Kumar - 2016 - Con-Textos Kantianos 3:90-121.
    In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant’s larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show that there exists a strand in Kant’s philosophy that permits us to interpret the representation of the transcendental self as a feeling of existence—as the obscurely conscious and temporally inaccessible modification (...)
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  • Kant's Neglected Alternative: Neither Neglected nor An Alternative.Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (1):69–90.
    This is a defense of Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from the contributions of others who have spoken for Kant in this regard is the construction of a general interpretive framework — a reconstruction of the one Kant provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the development of an ad hoc defensive strategy for refuting the charges. Hence, comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between focusing (...)
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  • The Shortest Way: Kant’s Rewriting of the Transcendental Deduction.Nathan Bauer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
    This work examines Kant’s remarkable decision to rewrite the core argument of the first Critique, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. I identify a two-part structure common to both versions: first establishing an essential role for the categories in unifying sensible intuitions; and then addressing a worry about how the connection between our faculties asserted in the first part is possible. I employ this structure to show how Kant rewrote the argument, focusing on Kant’s response to the concerns raised in (...)
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  • Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. 371-429.
    In this chapter, I show that there is at least one crucial, non-short, argument, which does not involve arguments about spatiotemporality, why Kant’s subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge, argued in the Transcendental Deduction, must lead to idealism. This has to do with the fact that given the implications of the discursivity thesis, namely, that the domain of possible determination of objects is characterised by limitation, judgements of experience can never reach the completely determined individual, i.e. the thing in itself (...)
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  • Freud’s Dreams of Reason: The Kantian Structure of Psychoanalysis.Alfred I. Tauber - 2009 - History of the Human Sciences 22 (4):1-29.
    Freud (and later commentators) have failed to explain how the origins of psychoanalytical theory began with a positivist investment without recognizing a dual epistemological commitment: simply, Freud engaged positivism because he believed it generally equated with empiricism, which he valued, and he rejected ‘philosophy’, and, more specifically, Kantianism, because of the associated transcendental qualities of its epistemology. But this simple dismissal belies a deep investment in Kant’s formulation of human reason, in which rationality escapes natural cause and thereby bestows humans (...)
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  • Kant on Animal Consciousness.Colin McLear - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can (...)
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  • Kant, autoconciencia y actualidad del principio de apercepción en la literatura analítica reciente.Diego Lawler - 2002 - Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 4 (1).
    Esta nota crítica consiste en una aproximación a la literatura analítica reciente que discute con mayor o menor interés algunas aristas del principio de apercepción kantiano. Prestando especial atención a la forma en que esta literatura acoge el enlace entre actividad judicativa y apercepción, se identifican grosso modo tres líneas interpretativas. Si bien entrañan teorías generales sobre la mente humana, aquí se trata de ver cómo cada una de ellas propicia una hipótesis de lectura sobre qué es lo que subyace (...)
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  • The Phenomenal Separateness of Self: Udayana on Body and Agency.Chakravathi Ram-Prasad - 2011 - Asian Philosophy 21 (3):323 - 340.
    Classical Indian debates about ?tman?self?concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western (...)
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  • Kant on the Original Synthesis of Understanding and Sensibility.Jessica J. Williams - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):66-86.
    In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times – which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant’s primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160–1n – and the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant (...)
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  • The Reflexive Project: Reconstructing the Moral Agent.Alfred I. Tauber - 2005 - History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):49-75.
    In the 17th century, ‘reflexivity’ was coined as a new term for introspection and self-awareness. It thus was poised to serve the instrumental function of combating skepticism by asserting a knowing self. In this Cartesian paradigm, introspection ends in an entity of self-identity. An alternate interpretation recognized how an infinite regress of reflexivity would render ‘the self’ elusive, if not unknowable. Reflexivity in this latter mode was rediscovered by post-Kantian philosophers, most notably Hegel, who defined the self in its self-reflective (...)
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  • Kant on the Content of Cognition.Clinton Tolley - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
    I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...)
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  • ‘An Almost Single Inference’ – Kant's Deduction of the Categories Reconsidered.Konstantin Pollok - 2008 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (3):323-345.
    By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the (...)
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  • Kant and the Most Difficult Thing That Could Ever Be Undertaken on Behalf of Metaphysics.Justin B. Shaddock - 2014 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (1).
    Kant calls his Transcendental Deduction "the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics" (4:260). Readers have found it not just difficult but downright impossible. I will address two long-standing problems. First, Kant seems to contradict his conclusion at the outset of his proof. He does so in both the 1781 and 1787 editions of his Critique of Pure Reason. Second, Kant seems to argue for his single conclusion twice over in his Critique's 1787 edition. I (...)
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  • Kant and the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.
    Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst (...)
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  • Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach.Svein Eng - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (2):288-310.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
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