Citations of work:

Campbell Brown & Yujin Nagasawa (2005). I Can't Make You Worship Me.

Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  85
    Fairness and Futility.Toby Betenson - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2):101-111.
    William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue that combining William Lane Craig’s arguments for the futility of life without God or immortality, together with a plausible amendment to his working definition of ‘futility’, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that life is futile if God does exist. Craig says that God must exist as a guarantor of ultimate justice, and that this ultimate ‘fairness’ (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Power to Make Others Worship.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):221 - 237.
    Can any being worthy of worship make others worship it? I think not. By way of an analogy to love, I argue that it is perfectly coherent to think that one could be made to worship. However, forcing someone to worship violates their autonomy, not because worship must be freely given, but because forced worship would be inauthentic—much like love earned through potions. For this reason, I argue that one cannot be made to worship properly; forced worship would be unfitting. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  88
    Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship.Wesley D. Cray - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):147-153.
    At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some more plausible than (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark