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  1. Impoverished or Rich Consciousness Outside Attentional Focus: Recent Data Tip the Balance for Overflow.Zohar Z. Bronfman, Hilla Jacobson & Marius Usher - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):423-444.
    Mind &Language, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 423-444, September 2019.
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  • Visual Attention Modulates Phenomenal Consciousness: Evidence From a Change Detection Study.Luca Simione, Enrico Di Pace, Salvatore G. Chiarella & Antonino Raffone - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...)
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  • Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects (...)
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  • Phillips on Unconscious Perception and Overflow.Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):649-662.
    Phillips argues that Block faces a “serious internal challenge” in defending the claim that unconscious perception is of the same fundamental kind as conscious perception. This challenge is said to result from Block’s commitment to phenomenal overflow. However, in this paper, I demonstrate that Phillips’ rejection of overflow likewise renders his view on unconscious perception “internally challenged” and therefore equally problematic.
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  • The Human Extended Socio-Attentional Field and its Impairment in Borderline Personality Disorder and in Social Anxiety Disorder.Oren Bader - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Being in the bodily presence of others facilitates important perceptual, social, and informational advantages. For example, it enables direct access to other subjects’ embodied perspectives, motivates intersubjective engagements, and is involved in the construction of shared experiences and joint actions. These advantages are based on and gained through attending to and with others, i.e. they rely on social attention. It is no surprise, therefore, that a growing body of empirical data indicates that social attention is a special attentional state that (...)
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  • No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Melanie Wilke, Stefan Frässle & Victor A. F. Lamme - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (12):757-770.
  • A Role for the Anterior Insular Cortex in the Global Neuronal Workspace Model of Consciousness.Matthias Michel - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:333-346.
    According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is (...)
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  • Methodological Artefacts in Consciousness Science.Matthias Michel - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):94-117.
    Consciousness is scientifically challenging to study because of its subjective aspect. This leads researchers to rely on report-based experimental paradigms in order to discover neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). I argue that the reliance on reports has biased the search for NCCs, thus creating what I call 'methodological artefacts'. This paper has three main goals: first, describe the measurement problem in consciousness science and argue that this problem led to the emergence of methodological artefacts. Second, provide a critical assessment of (...)
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  • Memory of Ensemble Representation Was Independent of Attention.Shenli Peng, BeiBei Kuang & Ping Hu - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?Michael A. Cohen, Daniel C. Dennett & Nancy Kanwisher - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):324-335.
    Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still see far less than we think we do. Taken (...)
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  • Ensemble Representation and the Contents of Visual Experience.McClelland Tom - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Of late philosophers of mind have been greatly exercised by a debate about the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’. The issue, roughly put, concerns the range of properties that ‘figure in’ perceptual experience. The focus of the debate has been very much on the contents of visual experience. It is relatively uncontroversial that colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture can all figure in the contents of visual experience. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these (...)
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
  • Can You Perceive Ensembles Without Perceiving Individuals?: The Role of Statistical Perception in Determining Whether Awareness Overflows Access.Emily J. Ward, Adam Bear & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Cognition 152:78-86.
    Do we see more than we can report? Psychologists and philosophers have been hotly debating this question, in part because both possibilities are supported by suggestive evidence. On one hand, phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness suggest that visual awareness is especially sparse. On the other hand, experiments relating to iconic memory suggest that our in-the-moment awareness of the world is much richer than can be reported. Recent research has attempted to resolve this debate by showing that observers (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness, Representational Content and Cognitive Access: A Missing Link Between Two Debates.Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1021-1035.
    Two debates loom large in current discussions on phenomenal consciousness. One debate concerns the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. Representationalism affirms, whereas “content separatism” denies, that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content. Another debate concerns the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. “Access separatism” affirms, whereas, e.g., the global workspace model denies, that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not cognitively accessed. I will argue that the two separatist views are related. Access separatism supports content (...)
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  • Iconic Memory is Not a Case of Attention-Free Awareness.Arien Mack, Muge Erol & Jason Clarke - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:291-299.
  • Perception of Ensemble Statistics Requires Attention.Molly Jackson-Nielsen, Michael A. Cohen & Michael A. Pitts - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:149-160.
  • Hierarchical Organization in Visual Working Memory: From Global Ensemble to Individual Object Structure.Qi-Yang Nie, Hermann J. Müller & Markus Conci - 2017 - Cognition 159:85-96.
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  • Ensemble Representation and the Contents of Visual Experience.Tim Bayne & Tom McClelland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):733-753.
    The on-going debate over the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that ‘ensemble properties’ should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. (...)
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  • Rich Conscious Perception Outside Focal Attention.Ned Block - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (9):445-447.
    Can we consciously see more items at once than can be held in visual working memory? This question has elud- ed resolution because the ultimate evidence is subjects’ reports in which phenomenal consciousness is filtered through working memory. However, a new technique makes use of the fact that unattended ‘ensemble prop- erties’ can be detected ‘for free’ without decreasing working memory capacity.
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  • Psychophysical “Blinding” Methods Reveal a Functional Hierarchy of Unconscious Visual Processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:234-250.
  • A Brief Argument For Consciousness Without Access.Nicholas D'Aloisio‐Montilla - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):119-136.
    This paper proposes a new argument in favour of the claim that phenomenal consciousness overflows – that is, has a far higher capacity than – cognitive access. It shows that opponents of overflow implicate a necessary role for visual imagery in the change detection paradigm. However, empirical evidence suggests that there is no correlation between visual imagery abilities and performance in this paradigm. Since the use of imagery is not implicated in the performance strategy of subjects, we find a new (...)
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  • No Iconic Memory Without Attention.Arien Mack, Muge Erol, Jason Clarke & John Bert - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 40:1-8.
  • Comments on How Mack Et Al. See Iconic Memory.Talis Bachmann & Jaan Aru - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 34:73-74.