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  1. Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
    We present an extension of the basic revision theory of circular definitions with a unary operator, □. We present a Fitch-style proof system that is sound and complete with respect to the extended semantics. The logic of the box gives rise to a simple modal logic, and we relate provability in the extended proof system to this modal logic via a completeness theorem, using interpretations over circular definitions, analogous to Solovay’s completeness theorem forGLusing arithmetical interpretations. We adapt our proof to (...)
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  • Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):49-84.
    We present some proof-theoretic results for the normal modal logic whose characteristic axiom is \. We present a sequent system for this logic and a hypersequent system for its first-order form and show that these are equivalent to Hilbert-style axiomatizations. We show that the question of validity for these logics reduces to that of classical tautologyhood and first-order logical truth, respectively. We close by proving equivalences with a Fitch-style proof system for revision theory.
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  • Non-Classical Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    Circular denitions have primarily been studied in revision theory in the classical scheme. I present systems of circular denitions in the Strong Kleene and supervaluation schemes and provide complete proof systems for them. One class of denitions, the intrinsic denitions, naturally arises in both schemes. I survey some of the features of this class of denitions.
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  • Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
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  • Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  • Infinitary Contraction‐Free Revenge.Andreas Fjellstad - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):179-189.
    How robust is a contraction-free approach to the semantic paradoxes? This paper aims to show some limitations with the approach based on multiplicative rules by presenting and discussing the significance of a revenge paradox using a predicate representing an alethic modality defined with infinitary rules.
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  • Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
  • Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
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