Citations of work:

Richard A. Bryant & David Mallard (2003). Seeing is Believing: The Reality of Hypnotic Hallucinations.

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  1.  19
    Hypnosis and Belief: A Review of Hypnotic Delusions. [REVIEW]Michael H. Connors - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:27-43.
  2.  12
    Using Hypnosis to Disrupt Face Processing: Mirrored-Self Misidentification Delusion and Different Visual Media.Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Davide Rivolta & Peter W. Halligan - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  3.  14
    A Laboratory Analogue of Mirrored-Self Misidentification Delusion: The Role of Hypnosis, Suggestion, and Demand Characteristics.Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Vince Polito & Max Coltheart - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1510-1522.
    Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's own reflection in the mirror is a stranger. In two experiments, we tested the ability of hypnotic suggestion to model this condition. In Experiment 1, we compared two suggestions based on either the delusion's surface features (seeing a stranger in the mirror) or underlying processes (impaired face processing). Fifty-two high hypnotisable participants received one of these suggestions either with hypnosis or without in a wake control. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent (...)
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  4.  91
    The Imagination: Cognitive, Pre-Cognitive, and Meta-Cognitive Aspects.Kieron P. O'Connor & Frederick Aardema - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):233-256.
    This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible (...)
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