Switch to: References

Citations of:

Decision Theory

In Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hajek (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press (2016)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Probability in Ethics.David McCarthy - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford University Press. pp. 705–737.
    The article is a plea for ethicists to regard probability as one of their most important concerns. It outlines a series of topics of central importance in ethical theory in which probability is implicated, often in a surprisingly deep way, and lists a number of open problems. Topics covered include: interpretations of probability in ethical contexts; the evaluative and normative significance of risk or uncertainty; uses and abuses of expected utility theory; veils of ignorance; Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem; population size problems; (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.
    Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind:fzab031.
    We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural way (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Yet Another “Epicurean” Argument.Peter Finocchiaro & Meghan Sullivan - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):135-159.
    In this paper, we develop a novel version of the so-called Lucretian symmetry argument against the badness of death. Our argument has two features that make it particularly effective. First, it focuses on the preferences of rational agents. We believe the focus on preferences eliminates needless complications and emphasizes the urgency to respond to the argument. Second, our argument utilizes a principle that states that a rational agent's preferences should not vary in arbitrary ways. We argue that this principle underlies (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Rational Preference in Transformative Experiences.Saira Khan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6715-6732.
    L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience makes the claim that many important life decisions are epistemically and personally transformative in a way that does not allow us to assign subjective values to their outcomes. As a result, we cannot use normative decision theory to make such decisions rationally, or when we modify it to do so, decision theory leads us to choose in a way that is in tension with our authenticity. This paper examines Paul’s version of decision theory, and whether (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Normative decision analysis in forensic science.A. Biedermann, S. Bozza & F. Taroni - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 28 (1):7-25.
    This paper focuses on the normative analysis—in the sense of the classic decision-theoretic formulation—of decision problems that arise in connection with forensic expert reporting. We distinguish this analytical account from other common types of decision analyses, such as descriptive approaches. While decision theory is, since several decades, an extensively discussed topic in legal literature, its use in forensic science is more recent, and with an emphasis on goals such as the analysis of the logical structure of forensic expert conclusions regarding, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:354–364.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Decisional Dimensions in Expert Witness Testimony – A Structural Analysis.Alex Biedermann & Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Duty and Doubt.Seth Lazar - 2020 - Journal of Practical Ethics 8 (1):28-55.
    Deontologists have been slow to address decision-making under risk and uncertainty, no doubt because the standard approaches to non-moral decision theory appear superficially similar to consequentialist moral reasoning. I identify some central tenets of simple decision theory and show that they should not put deontologists off, before showing where we should go next to develop a comprehensive deontological decision theory.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • In Dubious Battle: Uncertainty and the Ethics of Killing.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):859-883.
    How should deontologists concerned with the ethics of killing apply their moral theory when we don’t know all the facts relevant to the permissibility of our action? Though the stakes couldn’t be higher, and uncertainty is endemic where killing is concerned, few deontologists have an answer to this question. In this paper I canvass two possibilities: that we should apply a threshold standard, equivalent to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applied for criminal punishment; and that we should fit our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2015 - In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations