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  1. You Are Just Being Emotional! Testimonial Injustice and Folk-Psychological Attributions.Rodrigo Díaz & Manuel Almagro - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5709-5730.
    Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...)
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  • Listening and Normative Entanglement: A Pragmatic Foundation for Conversational Ethics.Susan Notess - 2021 - Dissertation, Durham University
    People care very much about being listened to. In everyday talk, we make moral-sounding judgements of people as listeners: praising a doctor who listens well even if she does not have a ready solution, or blaming a boss who does not listen even if the employee manages to get her situation addressed. In this sense, listening is a normative behaviour: that is, we ought to be good listeners. Whilst several disciplines have addressed the normative importance of interpersonal listening—particularly in sociology, (...)
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  • Mansplaining as Epistemic Injustice.Nicole Dular - 2021 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1).
    “Mansplaining” is by now part of the common cultural vernacular. Yet, academic analyses of it—specifically, philosophical ones—are missing. This paper sets out to address just that problem. Analyzed through a lens of epistemic injustice, the focus of the analysis concerns both what it is, and what its harms are. I argue it is a form of epistemic injustice distinct from testimonial injustice wherein there is a dysfunctional subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange. As (...)
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