This paper examines a fundamental philosophical difference between two radical postcognitivist theories that are usually assumed to offer the same view of cognition; namely the autopoietic theory and the enactive approach. The ways these two theories understand cognition, it is argued, are not compatible nor incompatible but rather incommensurable. The reason, so it is argued, is that while enactivism, following the traditional stance held by most of the cognitive theories, understands cognitive systems as constituting a natural kind, the autopoietic theory (...) understands them as constituting only a conventional kind. Additionally, the paper shows that AT’s conventionalist stance about cognition, far from being an undesirable or useless position, offers some methodological virtues that might be timely and welcome in the agitated and revolutionary climate of current cognitive science. (shrink)

Research in social cognition aims to illuminate how agents can understand, communicate, and interact with other agents. When defining socio-cognitive abilities, standard cognitivist approaches tend to require demanding representational information processing. Thereby, they describe rather ideal cases. However, interdisciplinary research indicates multiple forms of how socio-cognitive abilities can be realized. Recent minimal approaches offer notions accommodating different kinds of cognitive processing. Nevertheless, the introduction of minimal cases of cognition raises new questions of how to account for commonalities and differences with (...) respect to the standard concepts. It seems to be a widespread strategy to adapt ideas of a two-system approach in order to distinguish less demanding instances from more demanding cases. This paper critically explores such an interpretation of a two-system approach and argues that a dichotomous understanding fails to capture the actual diversity of cognitive processes. (shrink)

En este texto se elabora un análisis historiográfico, filosófico y teórico en torno a diversas propuestas de caracterización, demarcación, y explicación de la conducta y la cognición. Asimismo, se construyen argumentos para favorecer una comprensión más integral y elaborada de los programas de investigación acerca de la conducta y la cognición. Con este fin, en la primera sección analizaremos y cuestionaremos tres mitos acerca de la historia de la psicología: la tesis de los paradigmas hegemónicos y los reemplazos revolucionarios, la (...) tesis de los paradigmas incomparables, y la tesis que exige un único paradigma dominante como requisito de cientificidad. Dado que estos mitos se derivan de ciertas ideas problemáticas de Kuhn, en la segunda sección ofreceremos una propuesta alternativa basada en la filosofía de la ciencia de Bunge. En las secciones tercera y cuarta exploraremos los significados de las palabras “conducta” y “cognición”, y su relevancia para corregir ciertos malentendidos que obstaculizan los debates entre los programas de investigación conductistas y cognitivos. En las secciones quinta y la sexta, discutiremos algunos mitos acerca del conductismo y del cognitivismo, y en la última sección ofreceremos algunas conclusiones sobre los temas abordados. Las herramientas que analizaremos permiten establecer un debate más racional entre programas de investigación científica, generar puentes de discusión y desarrollo teórico de una manera más integral y completa, y evitar caer tanto en el dogmatismo y la descalificación injustificada, como en las actitudes eclécticas. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...) maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf’s criticism that information registered in Otto’s notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition. (shrink)