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  1. A Framework for the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):1-16.
    The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, they (...)
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  • Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments Do Demonstrate.Francesco Guala - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):1-15.
    Strong Reciprocity theorists claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms that eliminate incentives to free ride, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. There is little doubt that costly punishment raises cooperation in laboratory conditions. Its efficacy in the field however is controversial. I distinguish two interpretations of experimental results, and show that the wide interpretation endorsed by Strong Reciprocity theorists is unsupported by ethnographic evidence on decentralised punishment and by historical evidence on (...)
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  • WEIRD Languages Have Misled Us, Too.Asifa Majid & Stephen C. Levinson - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):103-103.
    The linguistic and cognitive sciences have severely underestimated the degree of linguistic diversity in the world. Part of the reason for this is that we have projected assumptions based on English and familiar languages onto the rest. We focus on some distortions this has introduced, especially in the study of semantics.
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  • Examining Punishment at Different Explanatory Levels.Miguel dos Santos & Claus Wedekind - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):23-24.
    Experimental studies on punishment have sometimes been over-interpreted not only for the reasons Guala lists, but also because of a frequent conflation of proximate and ultimate explanatory levels that Guala's review perpetuates. Moreover, for future analyses we may need a clearer classification of different kinds of punishment.
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  • The Social Structure of Cooperation and Punishment.Herbert Gintis & Ernst Fehr - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):28-29.
    The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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  • Cognitive Systems for Revenge and Forgiveness.Michael E. McCullough, Robert Kurzban & Benjamin A. Tabak - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):1-15.
    Minimizing the costs that others impose upon oneself and upon those in whom one has a fitness stake, such as kin and allies, is a key adaptive problem for many organisms. Our ancestors regularly faced such adaptive problems. One solution to this problem is to impose retaliatory costs on an aggressor so that the aggressor and other observers will lower their estimates of the net benefits to be gained from exploiting the retaliator in the future. We posit that humans have (...)
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  • Ultimate and proximate explanations of strong reciprocity.Jack Vromen - 2017 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 39 (3):25.
    Strong reciprocity has recently been subject to heated debate. In this debate, the “West camp” :231–262, 2011), which is critical of the case for SR, and the “Laland camp” :1512–1516, 2011, Biol Philos 28:719–745, 2013), which is sympathetic to the case of SR, seem to take diametrically opposed positions. The West camp criticizes advocates of SR for conflating proximate and ultimate causation. SR is said to be a proximate mechanism that is put forward by its advocates as an ultimate explanation (...)
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  • Iq and the Values of Nations.Satoshi Kanazawa - 2009 - Journal of Biosocial Science 41 (4):537.
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  • Cooperation in and Out of the Lab: A Comment on Binmore’s Paper. [REVIEW]Francesco Guala - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (2):159-169.
    The disagreement between Binmore and the “behaviouralists” concerns mainly the kind of reciprocity mechanisms that sustain cooperation in and out of the experimental laboratory. Although Binmore’s scepticism concerning Strong Reciprocity is justified, his case for Weak Reciprocity and the long-run convergence to Nash equilibria is unsupported by laboratory evidence. Part of the reason is that laboratory evidence alone cannot solve the reciprocity controversy, and researchers should pay more attention to field data. As an example, I briefly illustrate a historical case (...)
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  • The Evolution of Individualistic Norms.Don Ross - 2012 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication. MIT Press. pp. 17.
    It is generally recognized that descriptive and normative individualism are logically independent theses. This paper defends the stronger view that recognition of the falsehood of descriptive individualism is crucial to understanding the evolutionary and developmental basis of normative individualism. The argument given for this is not analytic; rather, it is based on empirical generalizations about the evolution of markets with specialized labor, about the nature of information processing in large markets, and about the socialization of human children.
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  • Beyond WEIRD: Towards a Broad-Based Behavioral Science.Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):111-135.
    In our response to the 28 (largely positive) commentaries from an esteemed collection of researchers, we (1) consolidate additional evidence, extensions, and amplifications offered by our commentators; (2) emphasize the value of integrating experimental and ethnographic methods, and show how researchers using behavioral games have done precisely this; (3) present our concerns with arguments from several commentators that separate variable from or ; (4) address concerns that the patterns we highlight marking WEIRD people as psychological outliers arise from aspects of (...)
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  • Punishing for Your Own Good: The Case of Reputation-Based Cooperation.Claudio Tennie - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):40-41.
    Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation – and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.
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  • God’s Punishment and Public Goods.Dominic D. P. Johnson - 2005 - Human Nature 16 (4):410-446.
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  • The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions.Ara Norenzayan, Azim F. Shariff, Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Rita A. McNamara, Edward Slingerland & Joseph Henrich - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-86.
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  • Culture–Gene Coevolution, Norm-Psychology and the Emergence of Human Prosociality.Maciej Chudek & Joseph Henrich - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (5):218-226.
  • Causality, Teleology, and Thought Experiments in Biology.Marco Buzzoni - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (2):279-299.
    Thought experiments de facto play many different roles in biology: economical, ethical, technical and so forth. This paper, however, is interested in whether there are any distinctive features of biological TEs as such. The question may be settled in the affirmative because TEs in biology have a function that is intimately connected with the epistemological and methodological status of biology. Peculiar to TEs in biology is the fact that the reflexive, typically human concept of finality may be profitably employed to (...)
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  • Social Manipulation, Turn-Taking and Cooperation in Apes.Federico Rossano - 2018 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 19 (1-2):151-166.
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  • Engineering Human Cooperation.Terence C. Burnham & Brian Hare - 2007 - Human Nature 18 (2):88-108.
    In a laboratory experiment, we use a public goods game to examine the hypothesis that human subjects use an involuntary eye-detector mechanism for evaluating the level of privacy. Half of our subjects are “watched” by images of a robot presented on their computer screen. The robot—named Kismet and invented at MIT—is constructed from objects that are obviously not human with the exception of its eyes. In our experiment, Kismet produces a significant difference in behavior that is not consistent with existing (...)
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  • The Evolution and Development of Human Cooperation.Federica Amici - 2015 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 16 (3):383-418.
  • An Evolutionary Perspective on the Long-Term Efficiency of Costly Punishment.Ulrich J. Frey & Hannes Rusch - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (6):811-831.
    Many studies show that punishment, although able to stabilize cooperation at high levels, destroys gains which makes it less efficient than alternatives with no punishment. Standard public goods games (PGGs) in fact show exactly these patterns. However, both evolutionary theory and real world institutions give reason to expect institutions with punishment to be more efficient, particularly in the long run. Long-term cooperative partnerships with punishment threats for non-cooperation should outperform defection prone non-punishing ones. This article demonstrates that fieldwork data from (...)
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  • What Can Economics Contribute to the Study of Human Evolution?Don Ross - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (2):287-297.
    The revised edition of Paul Seabright’s The Company of Strangers is critically reviewed. Seabright aims to help non-economists participating in the cross-disciplinary study of the evolution of human sociality appreciate the potential value that can be added by economists. Though the book includes nicely constructed and vivid essays on a range of economic topics, in its main ambition it largely falls short. The most serious problem is endorsement of the so-called strong reciprocity hypothesis that has been promoted by several prominent (...)
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  • Proximate and Ultimate Causes: How Come? And What For? [REVIEW]David Haig - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):781-786.
    Proximate and ultimate causes in evolutionary biology have come to conflate two distinctions. The first is a distinction between immediate and historical causes. The second is between explanations of mechanism and adaptive function. Mayr emphasized the first distinction but many evolutionary biologists use proximate and ultimate causes to refer to the second. I recommend that ‘ultimate cause’ be abandoned as ambiguous.
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