Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Talking About Tools: Did Early Pleistocene Hominins Have a Protolanguage?Ronald Planer - 2017 - Biological Theory 12 (4):211-221.
    This article addresses the question of whether early Pleistocene hominins are plausibly viewed as having possessed a protolanguage, that is, a communication system exemplifying some but not all of the distinctive features of fully modern human language. I argue that the answer is “yes,” mounting evidence from the early Pleistocene “lithics niche.” More specifically, I first describe a cognitive platform that I think would have been sufficient, given appropriate socio-ecological conditions, for the creation and retention of a protolanguage. Then, using (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Minimal Mindreading and Animal Cognition.Anna Strasser - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien:1-25.
    _ Source: _Page Count 25 Human and non-human animals are social beings, both have social interactions. The ability to anticipate behavior of others is a fundamental requirement of social interactions. However, there are several ways of how agents can succeed in this. Two modes of anticipation, namely mindreading and behavior-reading, shape the animal mindreading debate. As a matter of fact, no position has yet convincingly ruled out the other. This paper suggests a strategy of how to argue for a mentalistic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Psychology of Epistemic Judgment.Jennifer Nagel & Jessica Wright - forthcoming - In Sarah K. Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, 2nd Edition.
    Human social intelligence includes a remarkable power to evaluate what people know and believe, and to assess the quality of well- or ill-formed beliefs. Epistemic evaluations emerge in a great variety of contexts, from moments of deliberate private reflection on tough theoretical questions, to casual social observations about what other people know and think. We seem to be able to draw systematic lines between knowledge and mere belief, to distinguish justified and unjustified beliefs, and to recognize some beliefs as delusional (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Goal Slippage: A Mechanism for Spontaneous Instrumental Helping in Infancy?John Michael & Marcell Székely - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):173-183.
    In recent years, developmental psychologists have increasingly been interested in various forms of prosocial behavior observed in infants and young children—in particular comforting, sharing, pointing to provide information, and spontaneous instrumental helping. We briefly review several models that have been proposed to explain the psychological mechanisms underpinning these behaviors. Focusing on spontaneous instrumental helping, we home in on models based upon what Paulus :77–81, 2014) has dubbed ‘goal-alignment’, i.e. the idea that the identification of an agent’s goal leads infants to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mapping the Minds of Others.Alexandria Boyle - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can make, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Young Children's Conceptions of Knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.
    How should knowledge be analyzed? Compositionally, as having constituents like belief and justification, or as an atomic concept? In making arguments for or against these perspectives, epistemologists have begun to use experimental evidence from developmental psychology and developmental linguistics. If we were to conclude that knowledge were developmentally prior to belief, then we might have a good basis to claim that belief is not a constituent of knowledge. In this review, I present a broad range of developmental evidence from the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Social Cognition, Mindreading and Narratives. A Cognitive Semiotics Perspective on Narrative Practices From Early Mindreading to Autism Spectrum Disorder.Claudio Paolucci - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):375-400.
    Understanding social cognition referring to narratives without relying on mindreading skills has been the main aim of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis proposed by Daniel Hutto and Shaun Gallagher. In this paper, I offer a semiotic reformulation of the NPH, expanding the notion of narrative beyond its conventional common-sense understanding and claiming that the kind of social cognition that operates in implicit false belief task competency is developed out of the narrative logic of interaction. I will try to show how experience (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Commentary on Theory of Mind.Marilyn Shatz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Theory of Mind: A New Perspective on the Puzzle of Belief Ascription.Gabriella Airenti - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Pro-Social Cognition: Helping, Practical Reasons, and ‘Theory of Mind’.Johannes Roessler & Josef Perner - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):755-767.
    There is converging evidence that over the course of the second year children become good at various fairly sophisticated forms of pro-social activities, such as helping, informing and comforting. Not only are toddlers able to do these things, they appear to do them routinely and almost reliably. A striking feature of these interventions, emphasized in the recent literature, is that they show precocious abilities in two different domains: they reflect complex ‘ theory of mind’ abilities as well as ‘altruistic motivation’. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Origins of Belief Representation: Monkeys Fail to Automatically Represent Others’ Beliefs.Alia Martin & Laurie R. Santos - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):300-308.
  • Basic Social Cognition Without Mindreading: Minding Minds Without Attributing Contents.Daniel Hutto - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):827-846.
    This paper argues that mind-reading hypotheses, of any kind, are not needed to best describe or best explain basic acts of social cognition. It considers the two most popular MRHs: one-ToM and two-ToM theories. These MRHs face competition in the form of complementary behaviour reading hypotheses. Following Buckner, it is argued that the best strategy for putting CBRHs out of play is to appeal to theoretical considerations about the psychosemantics of basic acts of social cognition. In particular, need-based accounts that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Belief Files in Theory of Mind Reasoning.Ágnes Kovács - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):509-527.
    Humans seem to readily track their conspecifics’ mental states, such as their goals and beliefs from early infancy. However, the underlying cognitive architecture that enables such powerful abilities remains unclear. Here I will propose that a basic representational structure, the belief file, could provide the foundation for efficiently encoding, and updating information about, others’ beliefs in online social interactions. I will discuss the representational possibilities offered by the belief file and the ways in which the repertoire of mental state reasoning (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Mental Files in Development: Dual Naming, False Belief, Identity and Intensionality.Josef Perner & Brian Leahy - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):491-508.
    We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated. They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot yet link (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Simple Explanation of Apparent Early Mindreading: Infants’ Sensitivity to Goals and Gaze Direction.Marco Fenici - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):497-515.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Viewing Others as Equals: The Non-Cognitive Roots of Shared Intentionality.Alejandro Rosas & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):485-502.
    We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. The first one takes into account that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills. The second one seeks to integrate cognitive and non-cognitive skills into that capacity. This second adjustment is motivated by two facts. First, there is an enormous difference between human infants and our closest living primate relatives with respect to the range and scale of goal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds.Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
    The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Putting Unicepts to Work: A Teleosemantic Perspective on the Infant Mindreading Puzzle.John Michael - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4365-4388.
    In this paper, I show how theoretical discussion of recent research on the abilities of infants and young children to represent other agents’ beliefs has been shaped by a descriptivist conception of mental content, i.e., to the notion that the distal content of a mental representation is fixed by the core body of knowledge that is associated with that mental representation. I also show how alternative conceptions of mental content—and in particular Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic approach—make it possible to endorse the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • In Defense of a Developmental Dogma: Children Acquire Propositional Attitude Folk Psychology Around Age 4.Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):689-707.
    When do children acquire a propositional attitude folk psychology or theory of mind? The orthodox answer to this central question of developmental ToM research had long been that around age 4 children begin to apply “belief” and other propositional attitude concepts. This orthodoxy has recently come under serious attack, though, from two sides: Scoffers complain that it over-estimates children’s early competence and claim that a proper understanding of propositional attitudes emerges only much later. Boosters criticize the orthodoxy for underestimating early (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Continuing Debates on Direct Social Perception: Some Notes on Gallagher’s Analysis of “the New Hybrids”.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:466-471.
    This commentary argues that Gallagher's account of direct social perception has remained underdeveloped in several respects. Gallagher has not provided convincing evidence to support his claim that mindreading is rare in social situations. He and other direct perception theorists have not offered a substantive critique of standard theories of mindreading because they have attacked a much stronger claim about the putative unobservability of mental states than most theories of mindreading imply. To provide a genuine alternative to standard theories of mindreading, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Surprise! 20-Month-Old Infants Understand the Emotional Consequences of False Beliefs.Rose M. Scott - 2017 - Cognition 159:33-47.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Do Early Body Ornaments Prove Cognitive Modernity? A Critical Analysis From Situated Cognition.Duilio Garofoli - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):803-825.
    The documented appearance of body ornaments in the archaeological record of early anatomically modern human and late Neanderthal populations has been claimed to be proof of symbolism and cognitive modernity. Recently, Henshilwood and Dubreuil (Current Anthropology 52:361–400, 2011) have supported this stance by arguing that the use of beads and body painting implies the presence of properties typical of modern cognition: high-level theory of mind and awareness of abstract social standards. In this paper I shall disagree with this position. For (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Interacting Timescales in Perspective-Taking.Rick Dale, Alexia Galati, Camila Alviar, Pablo Contreras Kallens, Adolfo G. Ramirez-Aristizabal, Maryam Tabatabaeian & David W. Vinson - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mindreading as Social Expertise.John Michael, Wayne Christensen & Søren Overgaard - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-24.
    In recent years, a number of approaches to social cognition research have emerged that highlight the importance of embodied interaction for social cognition (Reddy, How infants know minds, 2008; Gallagher, J Conscious Stud 8:83–108, 2001; Fuchs and Jaegher, Phenom Cogn Sci 8:465–486, 2009; Hutto, in Seemans (ed.) Joint attention: new developments in psychology, philosophy of mind and social neuroscience, 2012). Proponents of such ‘interactionist’ approaches emphasize the importance of embodied responses that are engaged in online social interaction, and which, according (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Understanding Others, Reciprocity, and Self-Consciousness.Katja Crone - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):267-278.
    The article explores the basic conceptual relationship between social cognition, intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. A much-debated recent approach to social cognition, the so-called interaction theory, is the view that the ability to perceive, understand and interpret the behavior of others relies on interaction in the sense of mutual coordination of the embodied agents involved. It will be shown that this notion of reciprocity is too weak in order to fully account for social understanding. It will be argued that the idea of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation?Marco Fenici - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):387-411.
    I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by claiming (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Chimps as Secret Agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.
    We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Current Evidence for Automatic Theory of Mind Processing in Adults.Dana Schneider, Virginia P. Slaughter & Paul E. Dux - 2017 - Cognition 162:27-31.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental Files and Belief: A Cognitive Theory of How Children Represent Belief and its Intensionality.Josef Perner, Michael Huemer & Brian Leahy - 2015 - Cognition 145:77-88.
    We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball was taken from box 1, the child (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Signature Limits in Mindreading Systems.J. Robert Thompson - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (7):1432-1455.
    Recent evidence that young children seem to both understand false belief in one sense, but not in another, has led to two-systems theorizing about mindreading. By analyzing the most detailed two-systems approach in studying social cognition—the theory of mindreading defended by Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill—I argue that that even when dutifully constructed, two-systems approaches in social cognition struggle to adequately define the mindreading systems in terms of signature processing limits, an issue that becomes most apparent when investigating mindreading in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How Direct is Social Perception?John Michael & Leon De Bruin - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:373-375.
  • Individualism Versus Interactionism About Social Understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):245-266.
    In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Evolution and Development of Visual Perspective Taking.Ben Phillips - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    I outline three conceptions of seeing that a creature might possess: ‘the headlamp conception,’ which involves an understanding of the causal connections between gazing at an object, certain mental states, and behavior; ‘the stage lights conception,’ which involves an understanding of the selective nature of visual attention; and seeing-as. I argue that infants and various nonhumans possess the headlamp conception. There is also evidence that chimpanzees and 3-year-old children have some grasp of seeing-as. However, due to a dearth of studies, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Trivializing Modularity. An Associative-Representational Account of Cognition.Marco Mazzone - 2016 - Epistemologia (2):201-215.
  • Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root of all (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Three-Year-Olds' Understanding of Desire Reports Is Robust to Conflict.Kaitlyn Harrigan, Valentine Hacquard & Jeffrey Lidz - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Unintentional Perspective-Taking Calculates Whether Something is Seen, but Not How It is Seen.Andrew Surtees, Dana Samson & Ian Apperly - 2016 - Cognition 148:97-105.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Personal and the Subpersonal in the Theory of Mind Debate.Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):305-324.
    It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The New Hybrids: Continuing Debates on Social Perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:452-465.
  • Introduction: Teaching and its Building Blocks.Elena Pasquinelli & Sidney Strauss - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (4):719-749.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: An Innovative Play at Second Base.Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):593-609.
    I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Systems for Mindreading?Peter Carruthers - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):141-162.
    A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues. This has issued in a number of new findings. The present paper shows that the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Action-Based Versus Cognitivist Perspectives on Socio-Cognitive Development: Culture, Language and Social Experience Within the Two Paradigms.Robert Mirski & Arkadiusz Gut - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    Contemporary research on mindreading or theory of mind has resulted in three major findings: There is a difference in the age of passing of the elicited-response false belief task and its spontaneous–response version; 15-month-olds pass the latter while the former is passed only by 4-year-olds. Linguistic and social factors influence the development of the ability to mindread in many ways. There are cultures with folk psychologies significantly different from the Western one, and children from such cultures tend to show different (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Similarities and Differences in Visual and Spatial Perspective-Taking Processes.Andrew Surtees, Ian Apperly & Dana Samson - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):426-438.
  • Is a Modular Cognitive Architecture Compatible with the Direct Perception of Mental States?Jane Suilin Lavelle - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:508-518.
  • Various Ways to Understand Other Minds: Towards a Pluralistic Approach to the Explanation of Social Understanding.Anika Fiebich & Max Coltheart - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):235-258.
    In this article, we propose a pluralistic approach to the explanation of social understanding that integrates literature from social psychology with the theory of mind debate. Social understanding in everyday life is achieved in various ways. As a rule of thumb we propose that individuals make use of whatever procedure is cognitively least demanding to them in a given context. Aside from theory and simulation, associations of behaviors with familiar agents play a crucial role in social understanding. This role has (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Early False-Belief Understanding.Rose M. Scott & Renée Baillargeon - 2017 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):237-249.
  • Social Intelligence: How to Integrate Research? A Mechanistic Perspective.Marcin Miłkowski - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-10.
    Is there a field of social intelligence? Many various disciplines approach the subject and it may only seem natural to suppose that different fields of study aim at explaining different phenomena; in other words, there is no special field of study of social intelligence. In this paper, I argue for an opposite claim. Namely, there is a way to integrate research on social intelligence, as long as one accepts the mechanistic account to explanation. Mechanistic integration of different explanations, however, comes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Essence of Agency is Discovered, Not Defined: A Minimal Mindreading Argument.Andrew Sims - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    In this paper I give a novel argument for this view that the AGENT concept has an externalist semantics. The argument argues the conclusion from two premises: first, that our first relationships to agents is through a subpersonal mechanism which requires for its function an agential proto-concept which refers directly; and second, that there is a continuity of reference between this proto-concept and the mature concept AGENT. I argue the first on the basis of results in the developmental psychology of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark