The practical goal of preventing premature death seems uncontroversial. But the term ‘premature death’ is vague with several, sometimes conflicting definitions. This ambiguity results in several conceptions with which not all will agree. Moreover, the normative rationale behind the goal of preventing premature deaths is masked by the operational definition of existing measures. In this article, we argue that ‘premature death’ should be recognized as a normative concept. We propose that normative theories should be used to justify measures of premature (...) death to provide them with normative validity and public legitimacy. (shrink)

Coronavirus vaccines have made their debut. Now, allocation practices have stepped into the spotlight. Following Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines, states and healthcare institutions initially prioritised healthcare personnel and elderly residents of congregant facilities; other groups at elevated risk for severe complications are now becoming eligible through locally administered programmes. The question remains, however: whoelseshould be prioritised for immunisation? Here, we call attention to individuals institutionalised with severe mental illnesses and/or developmental or intellectual disabilities—a group highly susceptible to (...) the damages of COVID-19, recent research shows, and critical to consider for priority vaccination. The language describing both federal-level and state-level intentions for this population remains largely vague, despite the population’s diversity across age, diagnosis, functional status and living arrangement. Such absence of specificity, in turn, leaves room for confusion and even neglect of various subgroups. We review data stressing this group’s vulnerability, as well as select state plans for priority vaccination, highlighting the importance of clarity when describing intentions to vaccinate, or even generally care for, diverse populations composed of distinct subgroups in need. (shrink)

Macromarketing attempts to address issues that engage marketing and society and previous ethical scholarship has focused on distributive justice and on exchanges that occur in conventional markets. As our research highlights, however, the distributive justice approach alone is insufficient for managing the complexities, ethical paradoxes, and out-of-market conditions associated with wicked, cross-national social concerns. In this article, we integrate macromarketing with the theory of the common good in order to provide a foundation for framing societal change that can encompass nonmarket (...) value, stakeholder rights, collective social priorities, organizational responsibilities, and political action. (shrink)

Early intervention aims to identify children or families at risk of poor health, and take preventative measures at an early stage, when intervention is more likely to succeed. EI is concerned with the just distribution of “life chances,” so that all children are given fair opportunity to realize their potential and lead a good life; EI policy design, therefore, invokes ethical questions about the balance of responsibilities between the state, society, and individuals in addressing inequalities. We analyze a corpus of (...) EI policy guidance to investigate explicit and implicit ethical arguments about who should be held morally responsible for safeguarding child health and well-being. We examine the implications of these claims and explore what it would mean to put the proposed policies into practice. We conclude with some remarks about the useful role that philosophical analysis can play in EI policy development. (shrink)

The literature on democracy and disagreement has argued that the principle of respect for judgement requires that disagreement within democracy is resolved by a democratic decision. This paper raises the question what the principle of respect for judgement requires when there is disagreement on democratic inclusion. The paper argues that not all, but some, disagreements on democratic inclusion must be resolved by a democratic decision. Three reasons for when it need not are distinguished, issue-related reasons, people-related reasons, and judgement-related reasons. (...) When parties disagree on democratic inclusion because they disagree on basic principles, the disagreement need not be resolved by a democratic decision, for issue-related or for people-related reasons. When, instead, parties disagree on democratic inclusion despite agreeing on basic principles, the disagreement must be resolved by a democratic decision if the judgements of the disagreeing parties are reasonable. (shrink)

Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. This article aims to identify some complications with this approach: Under which circumstances can Rawls’s original position reasonably be applied to algorithmic fairness decisions? First, it is argued that there are important differences between Rawls’s original position and a (...) parallel algorithmic fairness original position with respect to risk attitudes. Second, it is argued that the application of Rawls’s original position to algorithmic fairness faces a boundary problem in defining relevant stakeholders. Third, it is observed that the definition of the least advantaged, necessary for applying the difference principle, requires some attention in the context of algorithmic fairness. Finally, it is argued that appropriate deliberation in algorithmic fairness contexts often require more knowledge about probabilities than the Rawlsian original position allows. Provided that these complications are duly considered, the thought-experiment of the Rawlsian original position can be useful in algorithmic fairness decisions. (shrink)

The UK’s Cancer Drugs Fund was introduced in 2010 following the Conservative Party’s promise to address the fact that numerous efficacious cancer drugs were not available because of their cost ineffectiveness, as deduced by the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence. While, at face value, this policy appears only to promote the UK’s public welfare, a deeper analysis reveals the ethically unjustifiable inconsistencies that the CDF introduces; where is the analogous fund for other equally severe diseases? Have the patients (...) without cancer been neglected simply due to the fear-inducing advertising and particularly ferocious speech which surrounds cancer? The CDF is unjustifiable when challenged by such questions. However, it is troubling to think that the CDF might be repealed in order to abolish these ethical concerns. Intuitively, one feels uncomfortable stripping the cancer patient of their benefits just so that they might be on an equally pessimistic footing with others. In the present essay, I argue that, although there are no ethically justifiable grounds for the CDF’s introduction, its removal would be inappropriate. Following this realisation, I investigate whether the procedural steps of the CDF itself—theoretically removed from the context of resource distribution for all disease types—represent an ethically justifiable system. I believe that the answer is yes, given the CDF’s conformity to accountability for reasonableness, a robust framework of procedural justice, which continuously improves the ethical and epistemological standards of the policies to which it is applied. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojamas vėlyvasis Platono pilietinio dalyvavimo modelis santykyje su šiuolaikine pilietine teorija. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad nors platoniškasis modelis atitinka tokius įprastus pilietinėms teorijoms kriterijus kaip lygybė, autonomija ir įgalinimas, esminė sąvoka norint suprasti šį projektą yra nuosaikumas. Būtent nuosaikumas struktūruoja ir vienija skirtingus šio modelio sudedamuosius elementus (įstatymų valdymas, preambulių įtikinimas, įgalinanti ekonomika ir švietimas) bei paaiškina, kokia yra esminė asmeninė dispozicija norint pasiekti stabilios ir racionalios politinės tvarkos.