Citations of work:

J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.

26 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

  1.  3
    Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):732-763.
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  15
    Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  30
    On Mathematical and Religious Belief, and on Epistemic Snobbery.Silvia Jonas - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (1):69-92.
    In this paper, I argue that religious belief is epistemically equivalent to mathematical belief. Abstract beliefs don't fall under ‘naive’, evidence-based analyses of rationality. Rather, their epistemic permissibility depends, I suggest, on four criteria: predictability, applicability, consistency, and immediate acceptability of the fundamental axioms. The paper examines to what extent mathematics meets these criteria, juxtaposing the results with the case of religion. My argument is directed against a widespread view according to which belief in mathematics is clearly rationally acceptable whereas (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  41
    Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.
    This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different accounts (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  19
    The Phenomenology of Hypo- and Hyperreality in Psychopathology.Zeno Van Duppen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):423-441.
    Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  13
    A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):389-404.
    I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Why Are We Certain That We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8.  10
    Epistemic Injustice in Assessment of Delusions.Abdi Sanati & Michalis Kyratsous - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):479-485.
  9.  36
    Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  2
    Levels and Kinds of Explanation: Lessons From Neuropsychiatry.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  30
    Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
    Jennifer Radden has drawn attention to two features of delusion, ambivalence and subjectivity, which are problematic for theories of delusion that treat delusions as empirical beliefs. She argues for an ‘attitude’ theory of delusion. I argue that once the cognitive architecture of delusion formation is properly described the debate between doxastic and attitude theorists loses its edge. That architecture suggests that delusions are produced by activity in the ‘default mode network’ unsupervised by networks required for decontextualized processing. The cognitive properties (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13.  82
    On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
    This article examines the supposedly incomprehensibility of schizophrenic delusions. According to the contemporary classificatory systems (DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10), some delusions typically found in schizophrenia are considered bizarre and incomprehensible. The aim of this article is to discuss the notion of understanding that deems these delusions incomprehensible and to see if it is possible to comprehend these delusions if we apply another notion of understanding. First, I discuss the contemporary schizophrenia definitions and their inherent problems, and I argue that the notion (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  14.  18
    First-Person Awareness of Intentions and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Romdenh-Romluc - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):493 - 514.
    Each of us enjoys a special awareness of (some) of her mental states. The adverbial model of first-person awareness claims that to be aware of a mental state is for it to be conscious, where ‘conscious’ describes the kind of state it is, rather than denoting a form of awareness directed at it. Here, I present an argument for construing first-person awareness of intentions adverbially, by showing that this model can meet a serious challenge posed by the simulation hypothesis, which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  2
    First-Person Awareness of Intentions and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):493-514.
  16.  32
    Understanding Schizophrenic Delusion: The Role of Some Primary Alterations of Subjective Experience. [REVIEW]Sarah Troubé - 2012 - Medicine Studies 3 (4):233-248.
    This paper explores the possibility of understanding schizophrenic delusion through the role of a primary alteration of subjective experience. Two approaches are contrasted: the first defines schizophrenic delusion as a primary symptom resisting any attempt to understand, whereas the second describes delusion as a secondary symptom, to be understood as a rational reaction of the self. The paper discusses the possibility of applying this second approach to schizophrenic delusion. This leads us to raise the issue of the specificity of psychotic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  34
    Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  31
    Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW]Garry Young - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
    This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19.  52
    Is the Impostor Hypothesis Really so Preposterous? Understanding the Capgras Experience.Marga Reimer - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.
    In his classic paper, “Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder,” Brendan Maher (1974) argues that psychiatric delusions are hypotheses designed to explain anomalous experiences, and are “developed through the operation of normal cognitive processes.” Consider, for instance, the Capgras delusion. Patients suffering from this particular delusion believe that someone close to them—such as a spouse, a sibling, a parent, or a child—has been replaced by an impostor: by someone who bears a striking resemblance to the “original” and who (for reasons unknown) (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20.  11
    In What Sense 'Familiar'? Examining Experiential Differences Within Pathologies of Facial Recognition.Garry Young - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):628-638.
    Explanations of Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia typically incorporate a dual-route approach to facial recognition in which a deficit in overt or covert processing in one condition is mirror-reversed in the other. Despite this double dissociation, experiences of either patient-group are often reported in the same way – as lacking a sense of familiarity toward familiar faces. In this paper, deficits in the facial processing of these patients are compared to other facial recognition pathologies, and their experiential characteristics mapped onto the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  69
    The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22.  78
    Why the Idea of Framework Propositions Cannot Contribute to an Understanding of Delusions.Tim Thornton - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):159-175.
    One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23.  24
    Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model.G. YounG - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
    In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  24.  24
    Attributional Style in a Case of Cotard Delusion.R. Mckay & L. CipoLotti - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):349-359.
    Young and colleagues . Betwixt life and death: case studies of the Cotard delusion. In P. W. Halligan & J. C. Marshall , Method in madness: Case studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.) have suggested that cases of the Cotard delusion result when a particular perceptual anomaly occurs in the context of an internalising attributional style. This hypothesis has not previously been tested directly. We report here an investigation of attributional style in a 24-year-old woman with Cotard (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  25.  22
    Models of Misbelief: Integrating Motivational and Deficit Theories of Delusions.R. Mckay, R. Langdon & M. Coltheart - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):932-941.
    The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. . How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: The Free Press.]. The influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological misbelief, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the motivational (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  26. In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations