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  1. Sincerity and Manipulation Under Approval Voting.Ulle Endriss - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (3):335-355.
    Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which (...)
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  • Choosers as Extension Axioms.Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (4):375-384.
    We consider the extension of a (strict) preference over a set to its power set. Elements of the power set are non-resolute outcomes. The final outcome is determined by an “(external) chooser” which is a resolute choice function. The individual whose preference is under consideration confronts a set of resolute choice functions which reflects the possible behaviors of the chooser. Every such set naturally induces an extension axiom (i.e., a rule that determines how an individual with a given preference over (...)
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