This essay addresses ‘the God‐haunted Atheist paradox’ in Sartre's early philosophy and argues against a series of efforts to show that Sartre maintains a ‘secular theology’. It shows that if Sartre's ontology is correct, the God of ‘classic theism’ cannot possibly exist. It argues against two sophisticated efforts to show that theological influences infiltrate Sartre's early ontology and permeate his moral psychology. It also rejects the claim that Sartre's (Existentialism is a Humanism, 1946/2007, Yale University Press) distinction between secular and (...) religious existentialism ‘has no basis in fact’. It shows that Sartre appropriates religious language in order to give debunking secular explanations for religious phenomena and that he inverts traditional Christian values. It concludes that Sartre is an anti‐theologian. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the role the double plays in the constitution of identity, focusing on the movement between the individual and the collective level. Notably, the latter today is often considered through the lens of identity politics. The double, I argue, poses an alternative to this type of politics, by showing the interdependence of groups. As a case study, this paper focuses on the complex relationship between the anti-Semite and the Jew as depicted by Sartre. I begin with (...) a psychoanalytical examination of the figure of the double,follow on with an analysis of Sartre's work in the light of the double, and conclude with Girard's theory of mimetic desire. (shrink)

This essay is divided into three parts. In the first, I develop a new interpretation of Sartre's notion of an original project, or original choice, by emending his initial position in Being and Nothingness, and by extrapolating from his autobiography and his psychobiographies on Baudelaire and Flaubert. In the second part, I examine the early and late Sartre's paradoxical commitment to self-analysis, and go on to draw taut the tension in the late Sartre between individual freedom and relations to others. (...) I demonstrate that the tension in the thought of the late Sartre can be explained and resolved only with reference to Sartre's own original projects. The third part is devoted to briefly analyzing what combination of factors in Sartre's developmental history led to his original projects, in view of a possible psychobiography on Sartre. Nearly everything covered in this essay is an attempt by Sartre to appropriate Freud as an instrument in his own thought. In the third part, I also try to show that Freud resists Sartre's analysis, as it were, and that Sartre only proves Freud right. (shrink)

This dissertation reassesses the complex philosophical relationship between Sartre and psychoanalysis. Most scholarship on this topic focuses on Sartre’s criticisms of the unconscious as anathema both to his conception of the human psyche as devoid of any hidden depths or mental compartments and, correlatively, his account of human freedom. Many philosophers conclude that there is little common ground between Sartrean existentialism and psychoanalytic theory. I argue, on the contrary, that by shifting the emphasis from concerns about the nature of the (...) unconscious to questions about the role of imagination in psychical life, we can see that Sartre and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory develop strikingly similar accounts of human subjectivity. After establishing the historical background of Sartre’s career-long engagement with psychoanalysis, I demonstrate the proximity of Sartre and Lacan on the nature of unconscious thought. I proceed to develop the claim that there is a homology between the concept of unconscious fantasy in psychoanalysis and the concept of the imaginary in Sartre’s philosophical corpus. Despite the concept of fantasy being one of the more structuralist-inspired aspects of Lacan’s metapsychology, I show that Sartre’s concept of the imaginary is likewise a structural feature of the psyche, one which establishes the coordinates within which the subject engages with the world. For Sartre, Freud, and Lacan fantasies form the core of subjectivity, giving form to the basic patterns of one’s character. Taken together, these three thinkers furnish a nuanced view of fantasy/the imaginary. On the one hand it is determining insofar as it is responsible for many of the psychopathologies met with in psychoanalysis. On the other hand, it is liberating insofar as the agency of the subject is implicated in the formation of fantasy. I thereby show that Sartre does not fit the caricatured picture of a radical voluntarist that is often attributed to him and that psychoanalysis can accommodate a conception of human freedom. (shrink)