ABSTRACT Does genetic relatedness define who is a mother or father and who incurs obligations towards or entitlements over children? While once the answer to this question may have been obvious, advances in reproductive technologies have complicated our understanding of what makes a parent. In a recent publication Bayne and Kolers argue for a pluralistic account of parenthood on the basis that genetic derivation, gestation, extended custody and sometimes intention to parent are sufficient (but not necessary) grounds for parenthood.1 Bayne (...) and Kolers further suggest that definitions of parenthood are underpinned by the assumption that ‘being causally implicated in the creation of a child is the key basis for being its parent’.2 This paper examines the claim that genetic relatedness is sufficient grounds for parenthood based on a causal connection between genetic parents and their offspring. I argue that parental obligations are about moral responsibility and not causal responsibility because we are not morally accountable for every consequence to which we causally contribute. My account includes the conditions generally held to apply to moral responsibility, i.e. freedom and foreseeability. I argue that parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. I consider the implications of this account for third parties involved in reproductive technologies. I argue that under some conditions the obligations generated by freely and foreseeably causing a child to exist can be justifiably transferred to others. (shrink)

Ovarian tissue transplantation is an experimental procedure that can be used to treat both infertility and premature menopause. Working within the current legal framework in the USA, I examine whether ovarian tissue should be legally treated like gametes or organs in the case of ovarian tissue transplantation between two women. One option is to base classification upon its intended use: ovarian tissue used to treat infertility would be classified like gametes, and ovarian tissue used to treat premature menopause would be (...) classified like organs. In the end, however, I argue that this approach will not work because it engenders too many legal, cultural and logistical concerns and that, at least for the near future, we should treat ovarian tissue like gametes. (shrink)