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  1. Abductive Inference Within a Pragmatic Framework.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    This paper presents an enrichment of the Gabbay–Woods schema of Peirce’s 1903 logical form of abduction with illocutionary acts, drawing from logic for pragmatics and its resources to model justified assertions. It analyses the enriched schema and puts it into the perspective of Peirce’s logic and philosophy.
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  • On the Logical Philosophy of Assertive Graphs.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):375-397.
    The logic of assertive graphs is a modification of Peirce’s logic of existential graphs, which is intuitionistic and which takes assertions as its explicit object of study. In this paper we extend AGs into a classical graphical logic of assertions whose internal logic is classical. The characteristic feature is that both AGs and ClAG retain deep-inference rules of transformation. Unlike classical EGs, both AGs and ClAG can do so without explicitly introducing polarities of areas in their language. We then compare (...)
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  • Assertive Graphs.F. Bellucci, D. Chiffi & A.-V. Pietarinen - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1):72-91.
    Peirce and Frege both distinguished between the propositional content of an assertion and the assertion of a propositional content, but with different notational means. We present a modification of Peirce’s graphical method of logic that can be used to reason about assertions in a manner similar to Peirce’s original method. We propose a new system of Assertive Graphs, which unlike the tradition that follows Frege involves no ad hoc sign of assertion. We show that axioms of intuitionistic logic can be (...)
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  • Is Classical Mathematics Appropriate for Theory of Computation?Farzad Didehvar - manuscript
    Throughout this paper, we are trying to show how and why our Mathematical frame-work seems inappropriate to solve problems in Theory of Computation. More exactly, the concept of turning back in time in paradoxes causes inconsistency in modeling of the concept of Time in some semantic situations. As we see in the first chapter, by introducing a version of “Unexpected Hanging Paradox”,first we attempt to open a new explanation for some paradoxes. In the second step, by applying this paradox, it (...)
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  • Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science: Edited by Lorenzo Magnani and Tommaso Bertolotti, Cham, Springer, 2017, Xl + 1179 Pp., ISBN 9783319305257, €298.Daniele Chiffi - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (1):65-67.
    Volume 32, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 65-67.
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  • Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...)
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  • The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis.Daniele Chiffi & Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):1-22.
    The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a (...)
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