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  1. Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2020 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 30:e03009.
    This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue. It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons, and then I adapt these concepts so as (...)
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  • Processes as Pleasures in EN Vii 11-14: A New Approach.Joachim Aufderheide - 2013 - Ancient Philosophy 33 (1):135-157.
  • Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life.Emily Fletcher - 2014 - Phronesis 59 (2):113-142.
    In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a (...)
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  • An Inconsistency in the Philebus?Joachim Aufderheide - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):817 - 837.
    Plato's Philebus contains an intricate difficulty. Plato seems to hold both (a) that all pleasures are processes of becoming, a crucial premise in the argument that no pleasure is good (53c?55c) and (b) that some pleasures contribute in their own right to the goodness of the best life (64c?67b). Since it seems also plausible that only things which are good can contribute to the goodness of the best life in their own right, Plato's view seems to be inconsistent. Interpreters usually (...)
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