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R. Carnap & R. Jeffrey (eds.) (1971). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability.

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  1.  8
    Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds.Simon M. Huttegger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):90-116.
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  2.  34
    From Values to Probabilities.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3901-3929.
    According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value , to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This (...)
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  3.  49
    Carnapian and Tarskian Semantics.Pierre Wagner - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):97-119.
    Many papers have been devoted to the semantic turn Carnap took in the late 1930s after Tarski had explained to him his method for defining truth and his work on the establishment of scientific semantics. Commentators have often argued that the major turn in Carnap’s approach to languages had already been taken in the Logical Syntax of Language, but they have usually assumed that Carnap was happy to subsequently follow Tarski and adopt Tarskian semantics. In this paper, it is argued (...)
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  4.  72
    Causality as a Theoretical Concept: Explanatory Warrant and Empirical Content of the Theory of Causal Nets.Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1073-1103.
    We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal nets and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour. In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause–effect relations can be (...)
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  5. Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering: Inductive Logic in Rudolf Carnap's Scientific Philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
  6.  10
    Points of View Beyond Models: Towards a Formal Approach to Points of View as Access to the World. [REVIEW]Fernando Charro & Juan J. Colomina - 2014 - Foundations of Science 19 (2):137-151.
    According to Vázquez and Liz (Found Sci 16(4): 383–391, 2011), Points of View (PoV) can be considered in two different ways. On the one hand, they can be explained following the model of propositional attitudes. This model assumes that the internal structure of a PoV is constituted by a subject, a set of contents, and a set of relations between the subject and those contents. On the other hand, we can analyze points of view taking as a model the notions (...)
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  7.  10
    Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.
    I introduce a mathematical account of expectation based on a qualitative criterion of coherence for qualitative comparisons between gambles (or random quantities). The qualitative comparisons may be interpreted as an agent’s comparative preference judgments over options or more directly as an agent’s comparative expectation judgments over random quantities. The criterion of coherence is reminiscent of de Finetti’s quantitative criterion of coherence for betting, yet it does not impose an Archimedean condition on an agent’s comparative judgments, it does not require the (...)
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  8.  56
    Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  9. A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.
    Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that (...)
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  10.  89
    Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
    It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that all swans are white and all lions are brave simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it (...)
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  11.  51
    A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
    Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme (...)
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  12. The New Tweety Puzzle: Arguments Against Monistic Bayesian Approaches in Epistemology and Cognitive Science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.
    In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...)
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  13.  82
    Reward Versus Risk in Uncertain Inference: Theorems and Simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
    Systems of logico-probabilistic reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems _O, P_, _Z_, and _QC_. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence _. LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In the first part of the paper, we (...)
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  14. Regularity Reformulated.Weng Hong Tang - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):329-343.
    This paper focuses on the view that rationality requires that our credences be regular. I go through different formulations of the requirement, and show that they face several problems. I then formulate a version of the requirement that solves most of, if not all, these problems. I conclude by showing that an argument thought to support the requirement as traditionally formulated actually does not; if anything, the argument, slightly modified, supports my version of the requirement.
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  15.  37
    Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain how recent work on (...)
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  16.  36
    Symmetry's End?J. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (1):53-67.
    We examine the idea that similar problems should have similar solutions (to paraphrase van Fraassen’s slogan ‘Problems which are essentially the same must receive essentially the same solution’, see van Fraassen in Laws and symmetry, Oxford Univesity Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 236) in the context of symmetries of sentence algebras within Inductive Logic and conclude that by itself this is too generous a notion upon which to found the rational assignment of probabilities. We also argue that within our formulation of (...)
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  17.  12
    A Note on Irrelevance in Inductive Logic.Jeff B. Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):357 - 370.
    We consider two formalizations of the notion of irrelevance as a rationality principle within the framework of (Carnapian) Inductive Logic: Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, JSP, which is classically important because it leads to Carnap's influential Continuum of Inductive Methods and the recently proposed Weak Irrelevance Principle, WIP. We give a complete characterization of the language invariant probability functions satisfying WIP which generalizes the Nix-Paris Continuum. We argue that the derivation of two very disparate families of inductive methods from alternative perceptions of (...)
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  18.  67
    Two Dogmas of Strong Objective Bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
    We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ' strong objective Bayesianism' is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is 'logical' and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are 'dogmatic'. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is (...)
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  19.  21
    Atom Exchangeability and Instantial Relevance.J. B. Paris & P. Waterhouse - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (3):313-332.
    We give an account of some relationships between the principles of Constant and Atom Exchangeability and various generalizations of the Principle of Instantial Relevance within the framework of Inductive Logic. In particular we demonstrate some surprising and somewhat counterintuitive dependencies of these relationships on ostensibly unimportant parameters, such as the number of predicates in the overlying language.
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  20.  34
    Some Aspects of Polyadic Inductive Logic.Jürgen Landes, Jeff Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (1):3-16.
    We give a brief account of some de Finetti style representation theorems for probability functions satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic, together with applications to Non-splitting, Language Invariance, extensions with Equality and Instantial Relevance.
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  21. The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  22. Analogical Predictions for Explicit Similarity.Jan Willem Romeijn - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):253 - 280.
    This paper concerns exchangeable analogical predictions based on similarity relations between predicates, and deals with a restricted class of such relations. It describes a system of Carnapian λγ rules on underlying predicate families to model the analogical predictions for this restricted class. Instead of the usual axiomatic definition, the system is characterized with a Bayesian model that employs certain statistical hypotheses. Finally the paper argues that the Bayesian model can be generalized to cover cases outside the restricted class of similarity (...)
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  23.  41
    Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science. [REVIEW]Samir Chopra & Eric Martin - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.
    We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class of structures in (...)
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  24.  48
    Some Observations on Induction in Predicate Probabilistic Reasoning.M. J. Hill, J. B. Paris & G. M. Wilmers - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):43-75.
    We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties.
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  25.  70
    Predictive Probability and Analogy by Similarity in Inductive Logic.Maria Concetta Di Maio - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (3):369 - 394.
    The λ-continuum of inductive methods was derived from an assumption, called λ-condition, which says that the probability of finding an individual having property $x_{j}$ depends only on the number of observed individuals having property $x_{j}$ and on the total number of observed individuals. So, according to that assumption, all individuals with properties which are different from $x_{j}$ have equal weight with respect to that probability and, in particular, it does not matter whether any individual was observed having some property similar (...)
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  26.  72
    Scientific Explanation: A Critical Survey. [REVIEW]Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
    This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...)
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  27.  32
    Strict Coherence, Sigma Coherence and the Metaphysics of Quantity.Brian Skyrms - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):39-55.
  28.  9
    Carnapian Inductive Logic for a Value Continuum.Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):78-89.
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  29. Carnap's Conventionalism.Richard Creath - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
  30.  52
    On Carnap: Reflections of a Metaphysical Student. [REVIEW]Abner Shimony - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):261 - 274.
  31.  35
    Probability Logic in the Twentieth Century.Theodore Hailperin - 1991 - History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (1):71-110.
    This essay describes a variety of contributions which relate to the connection of probability with logic. Some are grand attempts at providing a logical foundation for probability and inductive inference. Others are concerned with probabilistic inference or, more generally, with the transmittance of probability through the structure (logical syntax) of language. In this latter context probability is considered as a semantic notion playing the same role as does truth value in conventional logic. At the conclusion of the essay two fully (...)
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  32.  29
    The Bayes Rule is Not Sufficient to Justify or Describe Inductive Reasoning.Jürgen Humburg - 1987 - Erkenntnis 26 (3):379 - 390.
  33.  60
    Probabilism and Induction.Richard Jeffrey - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):51-58.
  34.  7
    Review. [REVIEW]Andreas Kamlah - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (2):235-252.
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  35.  77
    The Representation of Popper Measures.Wolfgang Spohn - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):69-74.
  36.  19
    Analogy by Similarity.Domenico Costantini - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (1):103 - 114.
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  37.  43
    Is There Any Theoretical Justification for a Nonstatement View of Theories?David Pearce - 1981 - Synthese 46 (1):1 - 39.
  38.  57
    Carnap's Inductive Probabilities as a Contribution to Decision Theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):325-367.
    Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a (...)
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  39.  3
    Carnap's Inductive Probabilities as a Contribution to Decision Theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Metamedicine 1 (3):325-367.
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  40.  71
    Propensity and Necessity.Ronald N. Giere - 1979 - Synthese 40 (3):439 - 451.
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  41.  35
    The Logico-Linguistic Evidence Underlying Montague's Language Descriptions.William S. Cooper - 1978 - Synthese 38 (1):39 - 71.
  42.  67
    Truthlikeness: Comments on Recent Discussion.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1978 - Synthese 38 (2):281 - 329.
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  43.  49
    The Philosophy of Hans Reichenbach.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 34 (1):5 - 88.
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  44.  22
    Where Luce and Krantz Do Really Generalize Savage's Decision Model.Wolfgang Spohn - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):113 - 134.
  45.  42
    Explicativity, Corroboration, and the Relative Odds of Hypotheses.Irving John Good - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):39 - 73.
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  46.  68
    Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals.William L. Harper - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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  47.  25
    Inducibility and Epistemic Systematization: Rejoinder to Kaufman.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):223 - 232.
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  48.  47
    Carnap's New System of Inductive Logic.Risto Hilpinen - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):307 - 333.
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  49.  20
    Review. [REVIEW]Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):417-436.
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  50.  35
    Meaning Constraints.H. Schnelle - 1973 - Synthese 26 (1):13 - 37.
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