Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Quine’s Substitutional Definition of Logical Truth and the Philosophical Significance of the Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays Theorem.Henri Wagner - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):182-199.
    The Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays theorem states that, for an arithmetical first-order language L, if S is a satisfiable schema, then substitution of open sentences of L for the predicate letters of S results in true sentences of L. For two reasons, this theorem is relevant to issues relative to Quine’s substitutional definition of logical truth. First, it makes it possible for Quine to reply to widespread objections raised against his account. These objections purport to show that Quine’s account overgenerates: it would count (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Shaping the Enemy: Foundational Labelling by L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Heyting.Miriam Franchella - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):152-181.
    The use of the three labels to denote the three foundational schools of the early twentieth century are now part of literature. Yet, neither their number nor their adoption has been stable over the twentieth century. They were not introduced by the founding fathers of each school: namely, neither Frege nor Russell spoke of ‘logicism’; and even Hilbert did not use the word ‘formalism’ to introduce his foundational programs. At a certain point, only Brouwer used the label ‘intuitionism’ in his (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Carnap's Noncognitivism About Ontology.Vera Flocke - forthcoming - Noûs.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • I—Emma Borg: Must a Semantic Minimalist Be a Semantic Internalist?Emma Borg - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):31-51.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Deviance And Vice: Strength As A Theoretical Virtue In The Epistemology Of Logic.Gillian Russell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well-defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Analysis as Translation.Diego Marconi - forthcoming - Topoi:1-14.
    Different notions of analysis have been both theorized and put to use in early analytic philosophy. Two of them stand out: connective analysis and analysis as paraphrase. The latter played a central role in the development of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond. With the advent of formal semantics of natural language in the 1970s, paraphrase came to be characterizable as translation into a formal “target language”. While I claim that the method cannot achieve its original philosophical aims, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Carnap on Empirical Significance.Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):217-252.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Geometric Conventionalism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.David De Vidi & Graham Solomon - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (5):773-783.
    We discuss in this paper the question of the scope of the principle of tolerance about languages promoted in Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language and the nature of the analogy between it and the rudimentary conventionalism purportedly exhibited in the work of Poincaré and Hilbert. We take it more or less for granted that Poincaré and Hilbert do argue for conventionalism. We begin by sketching Coffa's historical account, which suggests that tolerance be interpreted as a conventionalism that allows us (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Verificationism Revisited.Ruth Weintraub - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):83–98.
    I aim to stand the received view about verificationism on its head. It is commonly thought that verificationism is a powerful philosophical tool, which we could deploy very effectively if only it weren’t so hopelessly implausible. On the contrary, I argue. Verificationism - if properly construed - may well be true. But its philosophical applications are chimerical.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Philosophy Meets the Social Sciences: The Nature of Humanity in the Public Arena.Lee Wilkins & Clifford Christians - 2001 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 16 (2-3):99-120.
    Using a base of philosophical athropology, this article suggests that an ethical analysis of persuasion must include not just the logic human response, but culture and experience as well. The authors propose potential maxims for ethical behavior in advertising and public relations and applies them to two case studies, political advertising and the Bridgestone/Firestone controversy.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Justification Problems: Towards a Peircean Diagnosis and Solution.Liuhua Zhang - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (3):222-238.
    Responding to the paradox of inference and the related problems in philosophy of logic, this paper argues for the necessity of distinguishing between two different objects of justification: logica utens and logica docens. Then, equipped with Peirce’s critical common-sensist conception of logica utens and his classification of sciences, I propose a diagnosis of and a solution to the problem of justification of logic. I argue that this alternative approach successfully avoids circularity in which most attempts in philosophy of logic have (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Prospects for Ontology: Deflationism, Pluralism, and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Matthew C. Haug - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):593-616.
    In this paper, I critically discuss recent work on the role that the principle of tolerance plays in Rudolf Carnap's philosophy. Specifically, I consider how two prominent interpretations of Carnap's principle of tolerance can be used to argue for Carnap's anti-metaphysical views. I then argue that there are serious problems with these arguments, and I diagnose those problems as resulting, in part, from a tension between competing goals of Carnap's philosophical project.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • I—M Ust a S Emantic M Inimalist Be a S Emantic I Nternalist&Quest.Emma Borg - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):31-51.
    I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Early Formation of Modal Logic and its Significance: A Historical Note on Quine, Carnap, and a Bit of Church.Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (3):289-304.
    The aim of the paper is to show that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did not get the same attention that is considered to be the case nowadays. The community of logicians focused solely on the technical aspects of C. I. Lewis’ systems and did not take Quine's arguments and remarks seriously—or at least seriously enough to respond. In order to assess Quine's place in the history, however, his relation to Carnap is considered since their notorious break (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Logical and the Analytic.Richard Creath - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):79-96.
    This paper considers various objections to Carnap’s logical syntax definition of ’logical expression’, including those by Saunders Mac Lane and W. V. O. Quine. While the specific objections of these two authors can be answered, if necessary by a slight modification of Carnap’s definition, there are other objections that I do not see how to meet. I also consider the proposal by Denis Bonnay for avoiding the objections to Carnap’s definition. In light of the unresolved problems with Carnap’s definition, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Introduction: Logical Pluralism and Translation.Francesca Ervas, Antonio Ledda, Francesco Paoli & Giuseppe Sergioli - forthcoming - Topoi:1-2.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rudolf Carnap's 'Theoretical Concepts in Science'.Stathos Psillos - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (1):151-172.
    Rudolf Carnap delivered the hitherto unpublished lecture ‘Theoretical Concepts in Science’ at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at Santa Barbara, California, on 29 December 1959. It was part of a symposium on ‘Carnap’s views on Theoretical Concepts in Science’. In the bibliography that appears in the end of the volume, ‘The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap’, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a revised version of this address appears to be among Carnap’s forthcoming papers. But although Carnap started (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Friedman׳s Thesis.Ryan Samaroo - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):129-138.
    This essay examines Friedman's recent approach to the analysis of physical theories. Friedman argues against Quine that the identification of certain principles as ‘constitutive’ is essential to a satisfactory methodological analysis of physics. I explicate Friedman's characterization of a constitutive principle, and I evaluate his account of the constitutive principles that Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitation presuppose for their formulation. I argue that something close to Friedman's thesis is defensible.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Quine Against Lewis on Truth by Convention.Sean Morris - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Geometry of Knowledge: Lewis, Becker, Carnap and the Formalization of Philosophy in the 1920s.Alan Richardson - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):165-182.
    On an ordinary view of the relation of philosophy of science to science, science serves only as a topic for philosophical reflection, reflection that proceeds by its own methods and according to its own standards. This ordinary view suggests a way of writing a global history of philosophy of science that finds substantially the same philosophical projects being pursued across widely divergent scientific eras. While not denying that this view is of some use regarding certain themes of and particular time (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Syntactical Informational Structural Realism.Majid Davoody Beni - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (4):623-643.
    Luciano Floridi’s informational structural realism takes a constructionist attitude towards the problems of epistemology and metaphysics, but the question of the nature of the semantical component of his view remains vexing. In this paper, I propose to dispense with the semantical component of ISR completely. I outline a Syntactical version of ISR. The unified entropy-based framework of information has been adopted as the groundwork of SISR. To establish its realist component, SISR should be able to dissolve the latching problem. We (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Formal Analyticity.Zeynep Soysal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2791-2811.
    In this paper, I introduce and defend a notion of analyticity for formal languages. I first uncover a crucial flaw in Timothy Williamson’s famous argument template against analyticity, when it is applied to sentences of formal mathematical languages. Williamson’s argument targets the popular idea that a necessary condition for analyticity is that whoever understands an analytic sentence assents to it. Williamson argues that for any given candidate analytic sentence, there can be people who understand that sentence and yet who fail (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three different ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • How to Water a Thousand Flowers. On the Logic of Logical Pluralism.Andrea Sereni & Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation.Ingo Brigandt - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Towards an Evolutionary Pragmatics of Science.Asher Idan & Aharon Kantorovich - 1985 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 16 (1):47-66.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Logical Atomism, Elementarism, and the Analysis of Value.Gustav Bergmann - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (6):85 - 92.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conventionalism, Coordination, and Mental Models: From Poincaré to Simon.Rouslan Koumakhov - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (3):251-272.
    This article focuses on the conventions that sustain social interaction and argues that they are central to Simon's decision-making theory. Simon clearly identifies two kinds of coordination by convention: behavioral mores that shape human actions, and shared mental models that govern human perceptions. This article argues that Poincaré–Carnap's conventionalism provides powerful support for Simon's theory; it contends that this theory offers a more convincing account of decision and coordination than Lewis' concept of convention. Simon's approach to applying conventionalist logic to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Towards an Evolutionary Pragmatics of Science.Asher Idan & Aharon Kantorovich - 1985 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 16 (1):47-66.
    Fundamentismus und Skeptizismus-Anarchismus sind zwei entgegengesetzte Positionen in der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie und in der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie. Zwischen ihnen gibt es einen dritten Standpunkt, den Evolutionismus. Beispiele sind zwei neuere Arbeiten von Putnam und Stegmüller . Im Gegensatz zum logisch-statischen Fundamentismus berücksichtigt der Evolutionismus auch dynamische und naturalistische Ansätze. Stegmüller folgend entlehnen wir in der vorliegenden Untersuchung aus der Sprachphilosophie pragmatische Gesichtspunkte, um die logische Syntax und Semantik, die Werkzeuge des Fundamentismus, zu ersetzen. Wir zeigen die Kraft der Pragmatik bei der (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations