Switch to: References

Citations of:

Theories of Theories of Mind

Cambridge University Press (1996)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Judgement and the Role of the Metaphysics of Values in Medical Ethics.T. Thornton - 2006 - Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (6):365-370.
    Despite its authors’ intentions, the four principles approach to medical ethics can become crudely algorithmic in practice. The first section sets out the bare bones of the four principles approach drawing out those aspects of Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of biomedical ethics that encourage this misreading. The second section argues that if the emphasis on the guidance of moral judgement is augmented by a particularist account of what disciplines it, then the danger can be reduced. In the third section, I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Training for Generalization in Theory of Mind: A Study with Older Adults.Elena Cavallini, Federica Bianco, Sara Bottiroli, Alessia Rosi, Tomaso Vecchi & Serena Lecce - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Suffering Without Subjectivity.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
    This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Mental Mirroring as the Origin of Attributions.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (5):495-520.
    A ‘Radical Simulationist’ account of how folk psychology functions has been developed by Robert Gordon. I argue that Radical Simulationism is false. In its simplest form it is not sufficient to explain our attribution of mental states to subjects whose desires and preferences differ from our own. Modifying the theory to capture these attributions invariably generates innumerable other false attributions. Further, the theory predicts that deficits in mentalizing ought to co-occur with certain deficits in imagining perceptually-based scenarios. I present evidence (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Simulation, Co-Cognition, and the Attribution of Emotional States.Bill Wringe - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.
    In this paper I argue that there is a viable simulationist account of emotion attribution. However, I also try to say something specific about the form that this account ought to take. I argue that someone who wants to give by a simulationist account of emotion attribution should focus on similarities between emotions and perceptual judgments.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Animal Action in the Space of Reasons.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.
    I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The Ins and Outs of Introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
    Introspection admits of several varieties, depending on which types of mental events are introspected. I distinguish three kinds of introspection (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and three explanations of the general capacity: the inside access view, the outside access view, and the hybrid view. Drawing on recent evidence from clinical and developmental psychology, I argue that the inside view offers the most promising account of primary and secondary introspection.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
    It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of 'embodied (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability.Jane Heal - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.
    : Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation‐derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision.Gregory Currie - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):25-44.