Citations of work:

Hector-Neri Castañeda (1981). The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: The Simplest Solution to All of Them in One Fell Swoop.

12 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  10
    Maximalism Versus Omnism About Permissibility.Douglas Portmore - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):427-452.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  70
    Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
    One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  13
    A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance.Guillaume Aucher, Guido Boella & Leendert Torre - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 19 (2-3):187-231.
    Knowledge based privacy policies are more declarative than traditional action based ones, because they specify only what is permitted or forbidden to know, and leave the derivation of the permitted actions to a security monitor. This inference problem is already non trivial with a static privacy policy, and becomes challenging when privacy policies can change over time. We therefore introduce a dynamic modal logic that permits not only to reason about permitted and forbidden knowledge to derive the permitted actions, but (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  49
    A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance.Guillaume Aucher, Guido Boella & Leendert van der Torre - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 19 (2-3):187-231.
  5. Computational Meta-Ethics.Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (2):261-274.
    It has been argued that ethically correct robots should be able to reason about right and wrong. In order to do so, they must have a set of do’s and don’ts at their disposal. However, such a list may be inconsistent, incomplete or otherwise unsatisfactory, depending on the reasoning principles that one employs. For this reason, it might be desirable if robots were to some extent able to reason about their own reasoning—in other words, if they had some meta-ethical capacities. (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  14
    Explaining Compensatory Duties.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Legal Theory 16 (2):91-110.
    In some cases, harming another gives rise to a duty to compensate for harm done. This paper argues that the influential explanations of such duties of compensation—that they are somehow derived from rights intrusions, or breaches of duties not to harm—fail. I offer and defend an alternative explanation for why certain harms and not others give rise to compensatory duties, an explanation that seeks to derive them from wide-scope duties not to harm or to compensate for harm done.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323.
    It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form "s ought to 0") cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form "it ought to be the case that p"). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  37
    Von Wright’s Therapy to Jørgensen’s Syndrome.Juliano S. A. Maranhão - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (2):163 - 201.
    In his last papers about deontic logic, von Wright sustained that there is no genuine logic of norms. We argue in this paper that this striking statement by the father of deontic logic should not be understood as a death sentence to the subject. Rather, it indicates a profound change in von Wright's understanding about the epistemic and ontological role of logic in the field of norms. Instead of a logical constructivism of deontic systems revealing a necessary structure of prescriptive (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  34
    An Integrated Framework for Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do Constraints.P. D'Altan, J.-J. Ch Meyer & R. J. Wieringa - 1996 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (2):77-111.
  10.  34
    Free Choice and Contextually Permitted Actions.F. Dignum, J. -J. Ch Meyer & R. J. Wieringa - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):193 - 220.
    We present a solution to the paradox of free choice permission by introducing strong and weak permission in a deontic logic of action. It is shown how counterintuitive consequences of strong permission can be avoided by limiting the contexts in which an action can be performed. This is done by introducing the only operator, which allows us to say that only is performed (and nothing else), and by introducing contextual interpretation of action terms.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11.  58
    Stit and the Language of Agency.Michael Perloff - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):379 - 408.
    Stit, a sentence form first introduced in Belnap and Perloff (1988), encourages a modal approach to agency. Von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castañeda have all attempted modal treatments of agency, while Davidson has rejected such treatments. After a brief explanation of the syntax and semantics of stit and a restatement of several of the important claims of the earlier paper, I discuss the virtues of stit against the background of proposals made by these philososphers.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12.  32
    Obligation, Conditionals, and the Logic of Conditional Obligation.James E. Tomberlin - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):81 - 92.