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Quassim Cassam (2016). Vice Epistemology.

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  1.  36
    Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct.Christopher Baird & Thomas S. Calvard - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-14.
    Recognizing that truth is socially constructed or that knowledge and power are related is hardly a novelty in the social sciences. In the twenty-first century, however, there appears to be a renewed concern regarding people’s relationship with the truth and the propensity for certain actors to undermine it. Organizations are highly implicated in this, given their central roles in knowledge management and production and their attempts to learn, although the entanglement of these epistemological issues with business ethics has not been (...)
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  2.  33
    Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - forthcoming - Mind:fzx042.
    Epistemic trespassers judge matters outside their field of expertise. Trespassing is ubiquitous in this age of interdisciplinary research and recognizing this will require us to be more intellectually modest.
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  3.  99
    Is Open-Mindedness Truth-Conducive?B. J. C. Madison - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. -/- In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue (...)
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  4. Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...)
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  5.  11
    Epistemic Injustice in Mathematics.Colin Jakob Rittberg, Fenner Stanley Tanswell & Jean Paul Van Bendegem - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    We investigate how epistemic injustice can manifest itself in mathematical practices. We do this as both a social epistemological and virtue-theoretic investigation of mathematical practices. We delineate the concept both positively – we show that a certain type of folk theorem can be a source of epistemic injustice in mathematics – and negatively by exploring cases where the obstacles to participation in a mathematical practice do not amount to epistemic injustice. Having explored what epistemic injustice in mathematics can amount to, (...)
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  6.  49
    Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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  7.  12
    Connecting Virtues: Introduction.Michel Croce & Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):191-203.
    This article introduces the special issue “Connecting Virtues,” which aims to advance virtue theory by bringing into a conversation works on the virtues in epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy. The collection covers several key themes within virtue theory. It includes ground‐breaking articles offering original solutions to long‐standing issues in virtue theory, such as the plausibility of different lists of virtues, the relationship between virtues and their opposing vices and the connection between moral and intellectual virtues. In addition, the collection offers (...)
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  8. Expertise and Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):196-208.
    Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...)
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  9.  6
    What's Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising?Keith Harris - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:235-257.
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  10.  72
    Deep Epistemic Vices.Ian James Kidd - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:43-67..
    Although the discipline of vice epistemology is only a decade old, the broader project of studying epistemic vices and failings is much older. This paper argues that contemporary vice epistemologists ought to engage more closely with these earlier projects. After sketching some general arguments in section one, I then turn to deep epistemic vices: ones whose identity and intelligibility depends on some underlying conception of human nature or the nature of reality. The final section then offers a case study from (...)
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  11.  3
    Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:47-67.
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  12.  51
    Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367.
    This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that (...)
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  13.  2
    Rethinking Bias and Truth in Evidence-Based Health Care.Sietse Wieringa, Eivind Engebretsen, Kristin Heggen & Trish Greenhalgh - 2018 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 24 (5):930-938.
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  14.  24
    Intellectual Perseverance.Heather Battaly - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):669-697.
    _ Source: _Page Count 29 This essay offers a working analysis of the trait of intellectual perseverance. It argues that intellectual perseverance is a disposition to overcome obstacles, so as to continue to perform intellectual actions, in pursuit of one’s intellectual goals. The trait of intellectual perseverance is not always an intellectual virtue. This essay provides a pluralist analysis of what makes it an intellectual virtue, when it is one. Along the way, it argues that the virtue of intellectual perseverance (...)
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  15.  21
    Intellectual Perseverance.Heather Battaly - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):669-697.
    _ Source: _Page Count 29 This essay offers a working analysis of the trait of intellectual perseverance. It argues that intellectual perseverance is a disposition to overcome obstacles, so as to continue to perform intellectual actions, in pursuit of one’s intellectual goals. The trait of intellectual perseverance is not always an intellectual virtue. This essay provides a pluralist analysis of what makes it an intellectual virtue, when it is one. Along the way, it argues that the virtue of intellectual perseverance (...)
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  16.  23
    Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice.Charlie Crerar - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):753-766.
    Despite the now considerable literature on intellectual virtue, there remains relatively little philosophical discussion of intellectual vice. What discussion there is has been shaped by a powerful assumption—that, just as intellectual virtue requires that we are motivated by epistemic goods, intellectual vice requires that we aren't. In this paper, I demonstrate that this assumption is false: motivational approaches cannot explain a range of intuitive cases of intellectual vice. The popularity of the assumption is accounted for by its being a manifestation (...)
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