Citations of work:

André Chapuis (1996). Alternative Revision Theories of Truth.

10 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  6
    Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-9.
  2.  5
    Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  4
    Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendum P occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  27
    Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
  6.  37
    Notes on Ω-Inconsistent Theories of Truth in Second-Order Languages.Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.
    It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7.  59
    Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  19
    On Revision Operators.P. D. Welch - 2003 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2):689-711.
    We look at various notions of a class of definability operations that generalise inductive operations, and are characterised as “revision operations”. More particularly we: (i) characterise the revision theoretically definable subsets of a countable acceptable structure; (ii) show that the categorical truth set of Belnap and Gupta’s theory of truth over arithmetic using \emph{fully varied revision} sequences yields a complete \Pi13 set of integers; (iii) the set of \emph{stably categorical} sentences using their revision operator ψ is similarly \Pi13 and which (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  9.  32
    On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  10.  32
    Property Theory and the Revision Theory of Definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):212-246.
    Russell’s type theory has been the standard property theory for years, relying on rigid type distinctions at the grammatical level to circumvent the paradoxes of predication. In recent years it has been convincingly argued by Bealer, Cochiarella, Turner and others that many linguistic and ontological data are best accounted for by using a type-free property theory. In the spirit of exploring alternatives and “to have as many opportunities as possible for theory comparison”, this paper presents another type-free property theory, to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations