Citations of work:

David J. Chalmers (1999). First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness.

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  1.  88
    No Heterophenomenology Without Autophenomenology: Variations on a Theme of Mine. [REVIEW]Eduard Marbach - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):75-87.
    The paper assumes that the very source for an appropriate concept formation and categorization of the phenomena of consciousness is provided by pre-reflectively living through one’s own experiences (of perceiving, remembering, imagining, picturing, judging, etc.) and reflecting upon them. It tries to argue that without reflective auto-phenomenological theorizing about such phenomena, there is no prospect for a scientific study of consciousness doing fully justice to the phenomena themselves. To substantiate the point, a detailed reflective and descriptive analysis of re-presentational experiences (...)
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  2. The Critique of Pure Phenomenology.Alva Noë - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):231-245.
    The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.
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    First and Third-Person Approaches in Implicit Learning Research.Vincian Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.
    How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain.
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  4. Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads.Daniel D. Hutto - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
    Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, (...)
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