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David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.

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  1.  76
    Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv055.
  2.  2
    Cardiophenomenology: A Refinement of Neurophenomenology.Natalie Depraz & Thomas Desmidt - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    Cardiophenomenology aims at refining the neuro-phenomenological approach created by F. Varela as a new paradigm, jointly based on Husserl’s a priori dynamics of the living present and an experiment on anticipatory time-dynamics of visual motor perception. In order to do so, we will situate the paradigm of neurophenomenology at the cardio-vascular level, focusing on the emotional dynamics of lived experience and thus refining the dialogue, more precisely, the generative mutual constraints between first- and third-person analysis. In this article we present (...)
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    Gorillas in the Missed : Reevaluating the Evidence for Attention Being Necessary for Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
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  4.  33
    Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap.Janet Levin - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    ABSTRACTType B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of our phenomenal concepts, those concepts of our experiential states acquired through introspection. This view was once regarded as a promising response to anti-physicalist arguments that maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical concepts entails that phenomenal and physical properties are (...)
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  5.  7
    Dualism and its Place in a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry.Hane Htut Maung - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
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  6.  7
    Panpsychism, Intuitions, and the Great Chain of Being.Luke Roelofs & Jed Buchanan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    Some philosophical theories of consciousness imply consciousness in things we would never intuitively think are conscious—most notably, panpsychism implies that consciousness is pervasive, even outside complex brains. Is this a reductio ab absurdum for such theories, or does it show that we should reject our original intuitions? To understand the stakes of this question as clearly as possible, we analyse the structured pattern of intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with. We consider a variety of ways that the tension between this intuition (...)
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  7.  2
    Complementarity in Information Studies.Liqian Zhou - forthcoming - Synthese.
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  8.  6
    On the Rationality of Positive Mysterianism.James N. Anderson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (3):291-307.
    In Paradox in Christian Theology I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation (...)
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  9.  10
    Mapping Cognitive Structure Onto the Landscape of Philosophical Debate: An Empirical Framework with Relevance to Problems of Consciousness, Free Will and Ethics.Jared P. Friedman & Anthony I. Jack - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):73-113.
    There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution which parallels, and also extends, (...)
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  10.  5
    Quantum Theory and the Nature of Consciousness.Thomas Görnitz - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (3):475-510.
    Our interest focusses on the idea, that consciousness is a powerful acting entity. Up to now there does not exist a scientific concept for this idea. This is not due to problems within the field of psychology or brain research, but rather in resisting theories of modern physics. That is, why we have to search for a solution in the field of physics. A solution can be found in a new understanding of the basics of physical theory. That could be (...)
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  11.  5
    Collective Agency: Moral and Amoral.Frank Hindriks - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):3-23.
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  12.  42
    Can You Believe It? Illusionism and the Illusion Meta-Problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
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  13.  13
    The Curious Case of the Decapitated Frog: On Experiment and Philosophy.Alexander Klein - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):890-917.
    ABSTRACTPhysiologists have long known that some vertebrates can survive for months without a brain. This phenomenon attracted limited attention until the nineteenth century when a series of experiments on living, decapitated frogs ignited a controversy about consciousness. Pflüger demonstrated that such creatures do not just exhibit reflexes; they also perform purposive behaviours. Suppose one thinks, along with Pflüger's ally Lewes, that purposive behaviour is a mark of consciousness. Then one must count a decapitated frog as conscious. If one rejects this (...)
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  14.  13
    The Location and Boundaries of Consciousness: A Structural Realist Approach.Kristjan Loorits - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):523-537.
    Despite the remarkable progress made in consciousness research during recent decades, there is still no sign of a general agreement about the location of its object. According to internalists, consciousness resides inside the brain. According to externalists, consciousness is partly constituted by elements or aspects of the environment. Internalism comports better with the existence of dreams, hallucinations and sensory imaging. Externalism seems to provide a more promising basis for understanding how we can experience the world and refer to the content (...)
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  15.  7
    Framing the Mind–Body Problem in Contemporary Neuroscientific and Sunni Islamic Theological Discourse.Faisal Qazi, Don Fette, Syed S. Jafri & Aasim I. Padela - 2018 - The New Bioethics 24 (2):158-175.
    Famously posed by seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes, the mind–body problem remains unresolved in western philosophy and science, with both disciplines unable to move convincingly beyond the dualistic model. The persistence of dualism calls for a reframing of the problem through interdisciplinary modes of inquiry that include non-western points of view. One such perspective is Islamic theology of the soul, which, while approaching the problem from a distinct point of view, also adopts a position commensurate with dualism. Using this point (...)
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  16.  90
    First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (3):1-19.
    While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject's experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal (...)
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  17.  39
    Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.
    Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have to explain how both physical and phenomenal concepts provide a substantive grasp on the nature of their referents, whilst referring to the very same experience. This is the ‘new challenge’ to physicalism. In this paper, I argue that if the physicalist adopts the powerful qualities ontology of properties then a new and powerful version of the phenomenal concept strategy can be developed, which answers the new challenge.
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  18. The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
    One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory (...)
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  19. Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):67-79.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
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  20.  6
    El Problema de la Conciencia Para la Filosofía de la Mente y de la Psiquiatría.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3).
    Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría.
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  21.  7
    What Is It Like to Be a Social Scientist?Stephen J. DeCanio - 2017 - Critical Review 29 (2):121-140.
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  22.  2
    Narratives of Quantum Theory in the Age of Quantum Technologies.Alexei Grinbaum - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (4):295-306.
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  23. Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.
    I argue that the hard problem of consciousness occurs only in very limited contexts. My argument is based on the idea of explanatory perspectivalism, according to which what we want to know about a phenomenon determines the type of explanation we use to understand it. To that effect the hard problem arises only in regard to questions such as how is it that concepts of subjective experience can refer to physical properties, but not concerning questions such as what gives rise (...)
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  24.  24
    Naturalizing Psychedelic Spirituality.Chris Letheby - 2017 - Zygon 52 (3):623-642.
    A pressing philosophical problem is how to respond to the existential, anxiety and disenchantment resulting from a naturalistic worldview that eschews transcendent foundations for meaning and value. This problem is becoming more urgent as the popularization of neuroscientific findings renders a disenchanted conception of human beings ever more vivid, compelling, and widespread. I argue that the study of transformative experiences occasioned by classic psychedelic drugs such as lysergic acid diethylamide and psilocybin may reveal the nature of a viable practical solution (...)
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  25. The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?Tom McClelland - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):17-30.
    Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ‘hard’, which has troubling implications for the science and metaphysics of consciousness. Some regard it as ‘easy’, which ignores the special explanatory difficulties that consciousness offers. Others are unable to decide between these two uncomfortable positions. All three camps assume that the problem of consciousness is either easy or hard. I argue against this disjunction and suggest that the problem may be ‘tricky’—that is, partly easy and partly hard. (...)
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  26.  11
    Generative Explanation in Cognitive Science and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):267-291.
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  27.  21
    Quantum Mechanics in a New Light.Ulrich J. Mohrhoff - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (3):517-537.
    Although the present paper looks upon the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics as a calculus of correlations, it goes beyond a purely operationalist interpretation. Having established the consistency of the correlations with the existence of their correlata, and having justified the distinction between a domain in which outcome-indicating events occur and a domain whose properties only exist if their existence is indicated by such events, it explains the difference between the two domains as essentially the difference between the manifested world (...)
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  28.  71
    Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.
    I argue that metaphysicians of mind have not done justice to the notion of accessibility between possible worlds. Once accessibility is given its due, physicalism must be reformulated and conceivability arguments must be reevaluated. To reach these conclusions, I explore a novel way of assessing the zombie conceivability argument. I accept that zombies are possible and ask whether that possibility is accessible from our world in the sense of ‘accessible’ used in possible world semantics. It turns out that the question (...)
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  29.  50
    Hume on Mental Transparency.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):576-601.
    This article investigates Hume's account of mental transparency. In this article, I will endorse Qualitative Transparency – that is, the thesis that we cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our current perceptions, and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical – on the basis that, unlike its competitors, it is both weak enough to accommodate the introspective mistakes that Hume recognises, and yet strong enough to make sense of his positive employments of mental transparency. Moreover, Qualitative Transparency is (...)
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  30.  24
    Red is the Hardest Problem.William S. Robinson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):5-16.
    Philip Pettit has advocated a “looks as powers” theory as an alternative to theories that rely on instances of qualia in their account of looking red. Andy Clark has offered a similar view. If these accounts are successful, the Hard Problem is moribund. This paper asks how red comes into cases of something’s looking red to someone. A likely suggestion leads to a conundrum for LAPT: the physical complexity that it attributes to the property red is not evident in experience, (...)
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  31. The Signatures of Conscious Access and its Phenomenology Are Consistent with Large-Scale Brain Communication at Criticality.Enzo Tagliazucchi - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:136-147.
  32. The Structure and Dynamics Argument Against Materialism.Torin Alter - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):794-815.
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  33.  8
    The Nature of Primary Consciousness. A New Synthesis.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:113-127.
  34.  26
    On the Universal Mechanism Underlying Conscious Systems and the Foundations for a Theory of Consciousness.Joachim Keppler - 2016 - Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):346-367.
    In this article, I present a novel approach to the scientific understanding of consciousness. It is based on the hypothesis that the full range of phenomenal qualities is built into the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous background field and proceeds on the assumption that conscious systems employ a universal mechanism by means of which they are able to extract phenomenal nuances selectively from this field. I set forth that in the form of the zero-point field (ZPF) physics can offer a (...)
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  35.  45
    Ownership Unity, Neural Substrates, and Philosophical Relevance: A Response to Rex Welshon’s “Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity”.Lukasz A. Kurowski - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):123-132.
    In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon’s position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon’s definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon’s proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account (...)
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  36. What is It Like to Be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2016 - Noûs:295-319.
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
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  37.  47
    The Hard Problem & Its Explanatory Targets.Raamy Majeed - 2016 - Ratio 29 (3):298-311.
    Two decades in, whether we are making any progress towards solving, or even explaining away, what David Chalmers calls the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness is as controversial as ever. This paper aims to argue that there are, in actual fact, two explanatory targets associated with the hard problem. Moreover, this in turn has repercussions for how we assess the explanatory merits of any proposed solution to the problem. The paper ends with a brief exposition of how the present distinction goes (...)
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  38. Is Consciousness a Product of the Brain or/and a Divine Act of God? Concise Insights From Neuroscience and Christian Theology.Mark Pretorius - 2016 - Hts Theological Studies 72 (4).
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  39.  15
    What is It Like to Be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, Our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.Konrad Werner - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):921-946.
    I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that “what is it like” means primarily “what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject”.
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  40.  48
    The Unsolved Problems of Neuroscience.Ralph Adolphs - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):173-175.
    Some problems in neuroscience are nearly solved. For others, solutions are decades away. The current pace of advances in methods forces us to take stock, to ask where we are going, and what we should research next.
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  41.  44
    Uploading and Branching Identity.Michael A. Cerullo - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (1):17-36.
    If a brain is uploaded into a computer, will consciousness continue in digital form or will it end forever when the brain is destroyed? Philosophers have long debated such dilemmas and classify them as questions about personal identity. There are currently three main theories of personal identity: biological, psychological, and closest continuer theories. None of these theories can successfully address the questions posed by the possibility of uploading. I will argue that uploading requires us to adopt a new theory of (...)
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  42.  30
    Actual Consciousness: Database, Physicalities, Theory, Criteria, No Unique Mystery.Ted Honderich - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:271-300.
    Is disagreement about consciousness largely owed to no adequate initial clarification of the subject, to people in fact answering different questions clarified as actual consciousness. Philosophical method like the scientific method includes transition from the figurative to literal theory or analysis. A new theory will also satisfy various criteria not satisfied by many existing theories. The objective physical world has specifiable general characteristics including spatiality, lawfulness, being in science, connections with perception, and so on. Actualism, the literal theory or analysis (...)
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  43. Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602.
    Common sense suggests that visual consciousness is essential to skilled motor action, but Andy Clark—inspired by Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems theory—has appealed to a wide range of experimental dissociations to argue that such an assumption is false. Critics of Clark's argument contend that the content driving motor action is actually within subjects' experience, just not easily discovered. In this article, I argue that even if such content exists, it cannot be guiding motor action, since a review of current (...)
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  44.  43
    Mass Additivity and a Priori Entailment.Kelvin J. McQueen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1373-1392.
    The principle of mass additivity states that the mass of a composite object is the sum of the masses of its elementary components. Mass additivity is true in Newtonian mechanics but false in special relativity. Physicists have explained why mass additivity is true in Newtonian mechanics by reducing it to Newton’s microphysical laws. This reductive explanation does not fit well with deducibility theories of reductive explanation such as the modern Nagelian theory of reduction, and the a priori entailment theory of (...)
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  45.  30
    Beyond Words: Linguistic Experience in Melancholia, Mania, and Schizophrenia. [REVIEW]Louis Sass & Elizabeth Pienkos - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):475-495.
    In this paper, we use a phenomenological approach to compare the unusual ways in which language can be experienced by individuals with schizophrenia or severe mood disorders, specifically mania and melancholia. Our discussion follows a tripartite/dialectical format: first we describe traditionally observed distinctions ; then we consider some apparent similarities in the experience of language in these conditions. Finally, we explore more subtle, qualitative differences. These involve: 1, interpersonal orientation, 2, forms of attention and context-relevance, 3, underlying mutations of experience, (...)
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  46.  8
    History and the Hard Problem.Roger Smith - 2015 - Metascience 24 (3):413-416.
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  47.  5
    Lost in Time..Ceci Verbaarschot, Jason Farquhar & Pim Haselager - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:300-315.
  48. Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  49.  5
    What Explains Consciousness? Or...What Consciousness Explains?DonelsonE Dulany - 2014 - Mens Sana Monographs 12 (1):11.
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  50. What's Wrong with Strong Necessities?Philip Goff & David Papineau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
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