Switch to: References

Citations of:

Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason

Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard (2001)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Benatar and the Logic of Betterness.Ben Bradley - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (2):1-6.
    David Benatar argues that creating someone always harms them. I argue that his master argument rests on a conceptual incoherence.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Values in Water.Neelke Doorn - 2018 - Delft, Netherlands: Delft University of Technology.
    Inaugural speech spoken in acceptance of the chair ‘Ethics of water engineering’ at the Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology on 16 November 2018.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Waarden in water.Neelke Doorn - 2018 - Delft, Netherlands: Delft University of Technology.
    Intreerede In verkorte vorm uitgesproken op 16 november 2018 ter gelegenheid van de aanvaarding van het ambt van hoogleraar ‘Ethics of water engineering’ aan de faculteit Techniek, Bestuur en Management van de Technische Universiteit Delft.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Verdictive Organization of Desire.Derek Baker - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):589-612.
    Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than the question of what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. Both motivational force and phenomenological intensity seem relevant to a desire’s strength; however, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Indeterminacy Paradox: Character Evaluations and Human Psychology.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):1–42.
    You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.
    It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one’s higher-order attitudes do not align with one’s first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2017 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Can Modus Vivendi Save Liberalism From Moralism? A Critical Assessment of John Gray's Political Realism.Rossi Enzo - forthcoming - In John Horton, Manon Westphal & Ulrich Willems (eds.), The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Dordrecht: Springer.
    I argue that John Gray's modus vivendi-based justification for liberalism is preferable to the more orthodox deontological or teleological justificatory strategies, at least because of the way it can deal with the problem of diversity. But then I show how that is not good news for liberalism, for grounding liberal political authority in a modus vivendi undermines liberalism’s aspiration to occupy a privileged normative position vis-à-vis other kinds of regimes. So modus vivendi can save liberalism from moralism, but at cost (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
    You shouldn’t have done it. But you did. Against your better judgment you scrolled to the end of an article concerning the state of race relations in America and you are now reading the comments. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of physical violence, there is one comment that catches your eye. Spencer argues that although it might be “unpopular” or “politically incorrect” to say this, the evidence supports believing that the black diner in his section will (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Constraints on Rational Theory Choice.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):639-661.
    ABSTRACT In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Discriminação Privada E o Segundo Princípio da Justiça de Rawls.Leandro Martins Zanitelli - 2015 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 56 (132):393-411.
    RESUMO O artigo examina se há alguma incompatibilidade entre práticas de discriminação privada e as duas partes do segundo princípio da justiça de Rawls, o princípio da equitativa igualdade de oportunidades e o princípio da diferença. Argumento que a discriminação no trabalho e em outras áreas importantes para o desenvolvimento das aptidões inatas somente atenta contra o PEIO quando tem como efeito geral o de tornar substancialmente desiguais as chances de cidadãos com similares aptidões inatas e motivação exercerem determinadas ocupações. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Disvalue of Death in the Global Burden of Disease.Carl Tollef Solberg, Ole Frithjof Norheim & Mathias Barra - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (3):192-198.
    In the Global Burden of Disease study, disease burden is measured as disability-adjusted life years. The paramount assumption of the DALY is that it makes sense to aggregate years lived with disability and years of life lost. However, this is not smooth sailing. Whereas morbidity is something that happens to an individual, loss of life itself occurs when that individual’s life has ended. YLLs quantify something that involves no experience and does not take place among living individuals. This casts doubt (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Conservatism, Idealism and Cardinality.Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):286–295.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Commodification in Law: Ideologies, Intractabilities, and Hyperboles. [REVIEW]Nick Smith - 2009 - Continental Philosophy Review 42 (1):101-129.
    In this paper I first aim to identify, from a perspective mindful of both analytic and Continental traditions, the central normative issues at stake in the various debates concerning commodification in law. Although there now exists a wealth of thoughtful literature in this area, I often find myself disoriented within the webs of moral criteria used to analyze the increasingly ubiquitous practice of converting legal goods into monetary values. I therefore attempt to distinguish and organize these often conflated conceptual distinctions (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Précis of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.
    How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Distributing Risks: Allocation Principles for Distributing Reversible and Irreversible Losses.Neelke Doorn - 2018 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 21 (1):96-109.
    This paper aims to develop a framework for distributing risks. Based on a distinction between risks with reversible losses and risks with irreversible losses, I defend the following composite allocation principle: first, irreversible risks should be allocated on the basis of needs and only after some threshold level has been achieved can the remaining risks distributed in such a way that the total disvalue of these losses is minimized. An important advantage of this allocation framework is that it does not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Regulation, Compensation, and the Loss of Life: What Cost-Benefit Analysis Really Requires.Ty Raterman - 2012 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 15 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper defends two main claims. First: although it is easy to lose sight of this, what cost-benefit analysis really demands, in order to approve of a prospective policy, is that it be possible for those who would gain through the policy change to compensate those who would lose through it. And second: in cases where a policy change does, or can reasonably be expected to, lead to someone's death, the demand of compensability is much harder to satisfy than economists (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Social Dimension of Pluralism: Democratic Procedures and Substantial Constraints.Karsten Klint Jensen, Christian Gamborg & Peter Sandøe - 2011 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (3):313 - 327.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 313-327, October 2011.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical Reasoning for Serial Hyperspecializers.Elijah Millgram - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):261-278.
    Some species are weedy: they move from one ecological niche to another. Other species are specialized: they are exquisitely adapted to exploit a particular niche. Human beings are the design solution in which a species is simultaneously weedy and specialized - the trick being to manage the exquisite niche-specific adaptations in software rather than in the hardware. We are built to reprogram ourselves on the fly, to select new goals, new priorities and new guidelines appropriate to novel niches. Understanding ourselves (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Silent Prudence.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):349-364.
    It is commonly recognized that not all actions are candidates for moral evaluation. For instance, morality is silent on the issue whether to tie one's right shoe before one's left shoe or the other way around. This shoe-tying action is not a candidate for moral appraisal. The matter is amoral, for neither alternative is morally required nor forbidden, and both are permissible. It is not commonly recognized that not all actions are candidates for prudential evaluation. I shall argue, however, that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
    This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
    Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.
    This paper argues that several leading theories of subjunctive conditionals are incompatible with ordinary intuitions about what credences we ought to have in subjunctive conditionals. In short, our theory of subjunctives should intuitively display semantic humility, i.e. our semantic theory should deliver the truth conditions of sentences without pronouncing on whether those conditions actually obtain. In addition to describing intuitions about subjunctive conditionals, I argue that we can derive these ordinary intuitions from justified premises, and I answer a possible worry (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Consistency, Understanding and Truth in Educational Research.Andrew Davis - 2006 - Philosophy of Education 40 (4):487-500.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark