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David J. Chalmers (1995). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.

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  1. A Hesitant Defense of Introspection.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1165-1176.
    Consider the following argument: when a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena—certain conscious experiences—are introspectively observable; so, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations of conscious experiences. This paper offers a (preliminary and partial) defense of this line of thought. Much of the paper focuses on a specific challenge to it, which I call Schwitzgebel’s Challenge: the claim that introspection is so untrustworthy (...)
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    Towards a Computational Theory of Experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must (...)
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    Are Our Emotional Feelings Relational? A Neurophilosophical Investigation of the James–Lange Theory.Georg Northoff - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):501-527.
    The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct (...)
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  4. Neural Darwinism and Consciousness.Anil K. Seth & Bernard J. Baars - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):140-168.
    Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized (...)
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  5. Criteria for Consciousness in Humans and Other Mammals.Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & D. B. Edelman - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.
    The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness (...)
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    Are Perceptual Fields Quantum Fields?Brian Flanagan - 2003 - Neuroquantology 3:334-364.
    I argue that our sensory fields are photon fields. The philosophical foundation here is informed by mind/brain identity theory, such as we find in Russell, Feigl, Lockwood and Chalmers. In brief, given Dyson's observation that all material things consist of quantum fields, and given an identity of mind and brain, our sensory fields are then most plausibly photon fields.
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    Information Self-Organization and Consciousness—Towards a Holoinformational Theory of Consciousness.Francisco Biasdie & Mario Sergio Rocha - 1999 - World Futures 53 (4):309-327.
    (1999). Information self‐organization and consciousness—towards a holoinformational theory of consciousness. World Futures: Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 309-327.
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