ArgumentThe aim of this paper is two-fold: to offer an interpretation that preserves the natural reading ofPhysicsII 1 – that Aristotle is drawing a stark distinction between what is natural and what is artificial; and to show how there is logical room for atertium quid– a category for things that are products of both nature and art. This aim is attained by highlighting two important qualifications Aristotle makes about the products of art in relation to an innate internal principle of (...) change and pointing out that the proper understanding of the significance of the essential-accidental distinction that Aristotle draws must be viewed in the context where he identifies two kinds of nature – form and matter. Based on these analyses, the following three logical categories are shown to be consistent with the passage: 1) purely natural things; 2) essentially artificial objects; and 3) essentially natural things with artificial aspects. (shrink)

Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation offers many puzzles to those who wish to understand his theory both within the context of his biology and within the context of his more general philosophy of nature. In this paper, I approach the difficult and vague elements of Aristotle’s account of spontaneous generation not as weaknesses, but as opportunities for an interesting glimpse into the thought of an early scientist struggling to reconcile evidence and theory. The paper has two goals: to give as (...) charitable and full an account as possible of what Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation was, and to examine some of its consequences; and to reflect on Aristotle as a scientist, and what his comments reveal about how he approached a difficult problem. In particular, I propose that the well-recognized problem of the incompatibility between Aristotle’s concept of spontaneity and his theory of spontaneous generation presents an opportunity for insight into his scientific methodology when approaching ill-understood phenomena. (shrink)

Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbus Patrum on Holy Saturday and (2) that the human nature of Jesus is a hylemorphic compound, the unity of a human soul and prime matter. I argue that (1) and (2) are incompatible; for the name ‘Jesus’, ‘Christ’, and ‘Jesus Christ’ rigidly designates a human being. But, given a certain view of hylemorphism, the human being, Jesus, ceased to exist in the time between his death (...) and resurrection. So, Jesus did not descend to Hades/Limbus Patrum, even if God the Son did. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of perception is complicated by the fact that he recognizes three kinds of perceptible object: special, common, and incidental, all of which have different levels of reliability. Focusing on De Anima 3.3, 428b17–25, this paper discusses why these three sorts of perception are true and false. It argues that perceptions of special objects can be false because of the blind-spot phenomenon and that common objects are typically perceived as predicated of an incidental object. This helps explain why perceptions (...) of common objects are the most error prone. The paper ends with a suggestion about the importance of predicational perception for Aristotle's epistemology. (shrink)

In an attempt to reject Cartesian Dualism, some philosophers and scientists of the late twentieth century proposed a return to the ancient position that Descartes had opposed, i.e., Aristotle’s psychological hylomorphism, which applied to living beings the ontological thesis, according to which every substance is a compound of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). In this perspective, the soul is actual possession of the body’s capacity to perform a series of life functions. Therefore, according to Aristotle, soul and body are reciprocally (...) interdependent aspects of the living being, so that we must consider the former as an enmattered form, and the latter as an enformed or ensouled matter. This means that, for Aristotle, all the functions of the soul, even the highest ones like thought, are essentially connected with the body, since they ultimately require sensations. This paper illustrates and supports this doctrine in detail, especially in relation to the cognitive processes of the human mind. (shrink)

Modern readers view ancient theories of blood flow through the lens of circulation. Since the nineteenth century, scholarly work on the ancient understanding of the vascular system has run the gamut from attempting to prove that an ancient author had in fact, to some extent or another, pre-empted Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood or towards attempting, often with some empathetic embarrassment, to explain the failure on the part of an ancient author to notice something that seems so (...) obvious to the modern eye. Thus C.R.S. Harris's 1973 book The Heart and Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine, which remains the standard on the topic, opens with a sentence in which he marvels at how the otherwise admirable ancient Greek physicians could have ‘failed entirely to arrive at any conception of the circulation of the blood’. This modern vantage point has had an unfortunate effect. In the case of Aristotle in particular, understanding of his cardiovascular system has been diminished by a tendency to define it in contradistinction to our own modern understanding of circulation. By deliberately uncoupling from the framework of modern physiology, this paper will offer a richer and more accurate picture of his views. (shrink)

In De Anima III.3 Aristotle presents his official discussion of phantasia (“imagination” in most translations). At the very outset of the discussion Aristotle offers as an endoxon that “phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us” (428a1-2). Now a natural reading of this claim, taken up by many commentators, can pose a problem for Aristotle’s overall account of perception. Here I argue that, although it would be silly to deny that Aristotle considers phantasia (...) to be that in virtue of which a phantasma occurs to someone, it is not silly to deny that phantasmata are present in every case in which phantasia is operative. This suggestion bolsters the idea that, according to Aristotle’s account of veridical perception, we can understand the world as making itself perceptually manifest to the perceiver. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Xenocrates’ theory of indivisibles which would not commit him to the idea of ‘jerky motion’ criticized by Aristotle in Physica VI, yet would perfectly square with Plato’s Timaeus, the basis of Xenocrates’ canon. Relying on Alexander’s, Porphyry’s, and Themistius’s accounts of his theory, as well on a detailed analysis of De lineis insecabilibus, I suggest that Xenocrates’ minima, contrary to what Aristotle implies, are not to be understood as more or less stable particulars, like (...) tiny chunks of matter, moving about or leaping in physical space from point A to point B. Yet Xenocrates’ minima do remain ‘physical’ and ‘corporeal’ in a more Platonic sense of these words, not presupposing any kind of leaping, jumping, or jerking. This explains why Xenocrates associated the sensible realm with one of the three Fates, namely Clotho. (shrink)