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  1. Daylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be.Eliot Michaelson & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):833-843.
    Significant variations in the way objects appear across different viewing conditions pose a challenge to the view that they have some true, determinate color. This view would seem to require that we break the symmetry between multiple appearances in favor of a single variant. A wide range of philosophical and non-philosophical writers have held that the symmetry can be broken by appealing to daylight viewing conditions—that the appearances of objects in daylight have a stronger, and perhaps unique, claim to reveal (...)
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  • Editorial for Minds and Machines Special Issue on Philosophy of Colour.M. Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):123-132.
  • Perceptual Illusionism.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Perceptual illusionism is the view that perceptual experience is, in general, radically illusory. That is, perceptual experience presents objects as having certain sensible properties and standing in certain sensible relations, but nothing in the subject’s environment has those properties or stands in those relations. This paper makes the case for perceptual illusionism by showing how a broad set of philosophical and scientific considerations converge to support illusionism about the full range of sensible properties and relations. After clarifying the illusionist thesis, (...)
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  • Unknowable Color Facts.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Mind.
    It is common for an object to present different color appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: Both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: Both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: One experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, (...)
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  • Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):135-150.
    Back when researchers thought about the various forms that color vision could take, the focus was primarily on the retinal mechanisms. Since that time, research on human color vision has shifted from an interest in retinal mechanisms to cortical color processing. This has allowed color research to provide insight into questions that are not limited to early vision but extend to cognition. Direct cortical connections from higher-level areas to lower-level areas have been found throughout the brain. One of the classic (...)
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  • Ecumenicism, Comparability, and Color, Or: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):149-175.
    Data about perceptual variation motivate the ecumenicist view that distinct color representations are mutually compatible. On the other hand, data about agreement and disagreement motivate making distinct color representations mutually incompatible. Prima facie, these desiderata appear to conflict. I’ll lay out and assess two strategies for managing the conflict—color relationalism, and the self-locating property theory of color—with the aim of deciding how best to have your cake and eat it, too.
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  • The Uses of Colour Vision: Ornamental, Practical, and Theoretical.M. Chirimuuta & F. A. A. Kingdom - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):213-229.
    What is colour vision for? In the popular imagination colour vision is for “seeing the colours” — adding hue to the achromatic world of shape, depth and motion. On this view colour vision plays little more than an ornamental role, lending glamour to an otherwise monochrome world. This idea has guided much theorising about colour within vision science and philosophy. However, we argue that a broader approach is needed. Recent research in the psychology of colour demonstrates that colour vision is (...)
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