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  1. The Argument From Variation Against Using One’s Own Intuitions As Evidence.Esther Goh - 2019 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (2):95-110.
    In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, variation only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is wrong. Second, even though variation in intuitions shows that (...)
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  • Incommensurability and Wide-Ranging Arguments for Steadfastness in Religious Disagreements: Increasingly Popular, But Eventually Complacent.James Kraft - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    Choo and Pittard recently have presented new attractive incommensurability arguments for remaining steadfast in religious beliefs even when disagreeing with sophisticated disputants. This article responds to the latest iteration of this genre in the work of Choo, and does double duty evaluating more generally the merits of this genre, which is becoming increasingly more popular since originally championed by Alston. Both Choo and Alston argue that it is reasonable to stay steadfast in one’s religious beliefs when there are no commensurable (...)
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