Much research has examined the positive effects of legitimacy spillover. However, negative events may reduce the extent of legitimacy, which may in turn spillover to affect the legitimacy of important stakeholders including alliance partners. This study examines incidents of regulative legitimacy violation and focuses on the effect such incidents have on the alliance partners of the perpetrating organizations. We specifically examine three types of such violations—administrative law, criminal law, and civil law—to show that the loss of regulative legitimacy negatively influences (...) the stock market performance of alliance partners. More interestingly, not all corrective actions and repair efforts are equally impactful. We show that the effect of repair efforts by the perpetrating firm on the alliance partner differ depending on the nature of those violating incidents. (shrink)

This study investigates whether firms with fraudulent financial reporting time their earnings announcements strategically and finds that fraudulent firms are more likely to disclose their earnings in the after-market hours during their fraud periods to postpone fraud detection. Cross-sectional tests show that firms with lower visibility are more likely to adopt and benefit from this timing strategy. In addition, fraudulent firms are found to time their conference calls strategically and package their earning news with forecasts to flood the market with (...) information and lower the fraud detection rate. Results also show that unethical managers may benefit from insider trading when their firms use a timing strategy to lower the detection rate. This study sheds light on a potential strategy that unethical managers may adopt to camouflage their fraudulent financial reporting. These results are robust to a variety of settings of samples and model specifications. (shrink)

Institutional investors, policy makers, and researchers have advocated for greater director independence in hopes of improving corporate governance and discouraging unethical behaviors such as corporate frauds, accounting irregularities, and other organizational failures. However, increasing demands upon directors and sitting CEOs, as well as constraints on the number of boards on which they can serve, has resulted in a dramatic increase in the use of retired independent directors. Compared to other directors with full-time job demands, we argue that RIDs have lesser (...) time constraints and greater attentional capacities with which to discharge their responsibilities, thereby improving overall board “bandwidth.” Using S&P 1500 firms for the period of 2000–2012, we find that enhanced board bandwidth associated with an increased proportion of RIDs on the board relates to greater resource provisioning through reducing costs of capital, improved monitoring through reducing disclosure-related weaknesses, and better accounting and market performance. We thereby advance traditional board bandwidth research by contemplating the available time that independent directors would have by virtue of being retired and relating this to board effectiveness. (shrink)