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Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The Extended Mind.

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  1.  58
    Cognition and Behavior.Ken Aizawa - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    An important question in the debate over embodied, enactive, and extended cognition has been what has been meant by “cognition”. What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied, enactive, or extended? Rather than undertake a frontal assault on this question, however, this paper will take a different approach. In particular, we may ask how cognition is supposed to be related to behavior. First, we could ask whether cognition is supposed to be behavior. Second, we could ask whether we (...)
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  2.  6
    Bioethics and the Challenge of the Ecological Individual in Advance.Jonathan Beever & Nicolae Morar - forthcoming - Environmental Philosophy.
    Questions of individuality are traditionally predicated upon recognizing discrete entities whose behavior can be measured and whose value and agency can be meaningfully ascribed. We consider a series of challenges to the metaphysical concept of individuality as the ground of the self. We argue that an ecological conception of individuality renders ascriptions of autonomy to selves highly improbable. We find conceptual resources in the work of environmental philosopher Arne Naess, whose distinction between shallow and deep responses helps us rethink the (...)
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  3.  30
    What is the Extension of the Extended Mind?Hajo Greif - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Two aspects of cognitive coupling, as brought forward in the Extended Mind Hypothesis, are discussed in this paper: how shall the functional coupling between the organism and some entity in his environment be spelled out in detail? What are the paradigmatic external entities to enter into that coupling? These two related questions are best answered in the light of an aetiological variety of functionalist argument that adds historical depth to the “active externalism” promoted by Clark and Chalmers and helps to (...)
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  4.  34
    What Are Cognitive Processes? An Example-Based Approach.Albert Newen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    The question “What are cognitive processes?” can be understood variously as meaning “What is the nature of cognitive processes?”, “Can we distinguish epistemically cognitive processes from physical and biochemical processes on the one hand, and from mental or conscious processes on the other?”, and “Can we establish a fruitful notion of cognitive process?” The present aim is to deliver a positive answer to the last question by developing criteria for what would count as a paradigmatic exemplar of a cognitive process, (...)
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  5.  99
    Must Cognition Be Representational?William Ramsey - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    In various contexts and for various reasons, writers often define cognitive processes and architectures as those involving representational states and structures. Similarly, cognitive theories are also often delineated as those that invoke representations. In this paper, I present several reasons for rejecting this way of demarcating the cognitive. Some of the reasons against defining cognition in representational terms are that doing so needlessly restricts our theorizing, it undermines the empirical status of the representational theory of mind, and it encourages wildly (...)
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  6.  23
    Faith as Extended Knowledge.Kegan Shaw - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-19.
    You don’t know that p unless it’s on account of your cognitive abilities that you believe truly that p. Virtue epistemologists think there’s some such ability constraint on knowledge. This looks to be in considerable tension, though, with putative faith- based knowledge. For it can easily seem that when you believe something truly on the basis of faith this isn't because of anything you're competent to do. Rather faith-based beliefs are a product of divine agency. Appearances notwithstanding, I argue in (...)
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  7.  21
    Presence: Is It Just Pretending?Phil Turner - forthcoming - AI and Society.
  8.  4
    What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?Loughlin Victor & Zahidi Karim - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We (...)
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  9.  30
    Common-Sense Functionalism and the Extended Mind.Jack Wadham - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv071.
  10.  83
    What It Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain.Jan Westerhoff - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Recent discussions in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind have defended a theory according to which we live in a virtual world akin to a computer simulation, generated by our brain. It is argued that our brain creates a model world from a variety of stimuli; this model is perceived as if it was external and perception-independent, even though it is neither of the two. The view of the mind, brain, and world, entailed by this theory has some peculiar (...)
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  11.  13
    Seeing Through Eyes, Mirrors, Shadows and Pictures.Helen Yetter-Chappell - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    I argue that we can see in a great many cases that run counter to common sense. We can literally see through mirrors, in just the same way that we see through our eyes. We can, likewise, literally see through photographs, shadows, and paintings. Rather than starting with an analysis of seeing, I present a series of evolving thought experiments, arguing that in each case there is no relevant difference between it and the previous case regarding whether we see. In (...)
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  12.  29
    Phenomenal Consciousness, Collective Mentality, and Collective Moral Responsibility.Matthew Baddorf - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2769-2786.
    Are corporations and other complex groups ever morally responsible in ways that do not reduce to the moral responsibility of their members? Christian List, Phillip Pettit, Kendy Hess, and David Copp have recently defended the idea that they can be. For them, complex groups (sometimes called collectives) can be irreducibly morally responsible because they satisfy the conditions for morally responsible agency; and this view is made more plausible by the claim (made by Theiner) that collectives can have minds. In this (...)
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  13.  21
    Mind-Upload. The Ultimate Challenge to the Embodied Mind Theory.Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):425-448.
    The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately incompatible is unobvious. This paper, (...)
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  14.  7
    Semantic Inferentialism as Active Externalism.Adam Carter, James H. Collin & Orestis Palermos - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):387-402.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers :7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With (...)
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  15.  16
    A Philosophical Study of Human–Artefact Interaction.Manjari Chakrabarty - 2017 - AI and Society 32 (2):267-274.
  16.  41
    Enactive Affectivity, Extended.Giovanna Colombetti - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):445-455.
    In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo, that the enactive approach allows living systems to “extend”. Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also (...)
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  17.  14
    Collective Intentionality and Socially Extended Minds.Mattia Gallotti & Bryce Huebner - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):247-264.
    There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking (...)
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  18.  14
    The Multiple, Interacting Levels of Cognitive Systems Perspective on Group Cognition.Rob Goldstone & Georg Theiner - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):334-368.
    In approaching the question of whether groups of people can have cognitive capacities that are fundamentally different than the cognitive capacities of the individuals within the group, we lay out a Multiple, Interactive Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) framework. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision making, problem solving, and judgment. Rather than focusing on high-level constructs such as modules in an information processing (...)
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  19.  89
    Lessons and New Directions for Extended Cognition From Social and Personality Psychology.Joshua August Skorburg - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):1-23.
    This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the historical development of the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some instructive similarities between the two and consider possible objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for an analogously interactionist conception of extended cognition. (...)
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  20.  20
    New Perspectives on Artifactual and Biological Functions.Marc Artiga - 2016 - Applied Ontology 11 (2):89-102.
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  21.  22
    Bioethics and the Challenge of the Ecological Individual.Jonathan Beever & Nicolae Morar - 2016 - Environmental Philosophy 13 (2):215-238.
    Questions of individuality are traditionally predicated upon recognizing discrete entities whose behavior can be measured and whose value and agency can be meaningfully ascribed. We consider a series of challenges to the metaphysical concept of individuality as the ground of the self. We argue that an ecological conception of individuality renders ascriptions of autonomy to selves highly improbable. We find conceptual resources in the work of environmental philosopher Arne Naess, whose distinction between shallow and deep responses helps us rethink the (...)
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  22. Extended Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):259-273.
    According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...)
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  23.  3
    Is Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4):542-560.
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  24.  50
    Brandom, Peirce, and the Overlooked Friction of Contrapiction.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).
    Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a lot. However, for those who think that there is more to making correct/incorrect inferences than obeying/breaking accepted rules, Brandom’s account fails to adequately capture what it means to reason properly. Thus, in an effort to sketch an alternative that does not (...)
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  25.  21
    The Virtue Epistemology of Maria Montessori.Patrick R. Frierson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):79-98.
    This paper shows how Maria Montessori's thought can enrich contemporary virtue epistemology. After a short overview of her ‘interested empiricist’ epistemological framework, I discuss four representative intellectual virtues: sensory acuity, physical dexterity, intellectual love, and intellectual humility. Throughout, I show how Montessori bridges the divide between reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to the virtues and how her particular treatments of virtues offer distinctive and compelling alternatives to contemporary accounts. For instance, she emphasizes how sensory acuity is a virtue for which one (...)
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  26. The Cognitive Integration of Scientific Instruments: Information, Situated Cognition, and Scientific Practice.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):1-21.
    Researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences, particularly those working in laboratories, use a variety of artifacts to help them perform their cognitive tasks. This paper analyses the relationship between researchers and cognitive artifacts in terms of integration. It first distinguishes different categories of cognitive artifacts used in biological practice on the basis of their informational properties. This results in a novel classification of scientific instruments, conducive to an analysis of the cognitive interactions between researchers and artifacts. It then uses (...)
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  27. The Metaphysics of Cognitive Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):78-93.
    This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target (...)
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  28.  5
    The Metaphysics of Cognitive Artefacts.Richard Heersmink - unknown
    This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target (...)
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  29.  14
    LIS and BCIs: A Local, Pluralist, and Pragmatist Approach to 4E Cognition.Ruth Hibbert - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):187-198.
    Four previous papers in this journal have discussed the role of Brain-Computer Interfaces in the lives of Locked-In Syndrome patients in terms of the four “E” frameworks for cognition – extended, embedded, embodied, and enactive cognition. This paper argues that in the light of more recent literature on these 4E frameworks, none of the four papers has taken quite the right approach to deciding which, if any, of the E frameworks is the best one for the job. More specifically, I (...)
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  30.  17
    Out of Our Skulls: How the Extended Mind Thesis Can Extend Psychiatry.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1160-1174.
    The thesis that mental states extend beyond the skull, otherwise known as the extended mind thesis, has attracted considerable philosophical attention and support. It has also been accused of lacking practical import. At the same time, the field of psychiatry has remained largely unacquainted with ExM, tending to rely instead upon what ExM proponents would consider to be outdated models of the mind. ExM and psychiatry, therefore, have much to offer one another, but the connection between the two has remained (...)
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  31.  17
    Extended Virtues and the Boundaries of Persons.Robert J. Howell - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):146--163.
  32.  62
    What is Proof of Concept Research and How Does It Generate Epistemic and Ethical Categories for Future Scientific Practice?Catherine Elizabeth Kendig - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (3):735-753.
    “Proof of concept” is a phrase frequently used in descriptions of research sought in program announcements, in experimental studies, and in the marketing of new technologies. It is often coupled with either a short definition or none at all, its meaning assumed to be fully understood. This is problematic. As a phrase with potential implications for research and technology, its assumed meaning requires some analysis to avoid it becoming a descriptive category that refers to all things scientifically exciting. I provide (...)
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  33. Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
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  34.  15
    Zdravko Radman , The Hand: An Organ of the Mind, What the Manual Tells the Mental.Victor Loughlin - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):291-296.
    Hands undoubtedly matter. Few, I suspect, would disagree. Yet The Hand, an Organ of the Mind uses this commonplace to dispel what is termed the “intellectualist illusion” , the illusion that the things we do with our hands are always and everywhere guided by an in-the-head centralised planner. Radman’s spirited collection of essays makes the point that we are not the sort of “centralised knowers” that the history of cognitive science might have us believe. Rather the manual is primary: it (...)
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  35. Active Content Externalism.Holger Lyre - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):17-33.
    The aim of this paper is to scrutinize active externalism and its repercussions for externalism about mental content. I start from the claim that active externalism is a version of content externalism that follows from the extended cognition thesis as a thesis about cognitive vehicles. Various features of active content externalism are explored by comparison with the known forms of passive externalism – in particular with respect to the multiple realizability of the relevant external content-determining components and with respect to (...)
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  36.  2
    Sensorimotor Grounding of Musical Embodiment and the Role of Prediction: A Review.Pieter-Jan Maes - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  37.  3
    Affective Scaffolds, Expressive Arts, and Cognition.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  38.  17
    Revisiting the Self: A Sine Qua Non for Understanding Embodiment.V. Hari Narayanan - 2016 - AI and Society 31 (1):79-84.
  39.  30
    Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):305-334.
    Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s process reliabilist treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter anytime this may be the case. Indicatively, even though Lackey (...)
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  40.  35
    Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Daniel Pearlberg & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):41-57.
    In this paper we develop a novel argument against the extended mind hypothesis. Our argument constitutes an advance in the debate, insofar as we employ only premises that are acceptable to a coarse-grained functionalist, and we do not rely on functional disanalogies between putative examples of extended minds and ordinary human beings that are just a matter of fine detail or degree. Thus, we beg no questions against proponents of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather, our argument consists in making use (...)
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  41.  11
    Review of the Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process, by Nico Orlandi. [REVIEW]Ken Pepper - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):483-488.
  42.  3
    Educational Web Science.Michael A. Peters - 2016 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 48 (11).
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  43.  8
    Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack.Jan Slaby - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  44.  10
    Taking Stock of Extension Theory of Technology.Steffen Steinert - 2016 - Philosophy and Technology 29 (1):61-78.
    In this paper, I will focus on the extension theories of technology. I will identify four influential positions that have been put forward: (1) technology as an extension of the human organism, (2) technology as an extension of the lived body and the senses, (3) technology as an extension of our intentions and desires, and (4) technology as an extension of our faculties and capabilities. I will describe and critically assess these positions one by one and highlight their advantages and (...)
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  45.  56
    What is This Cognition That is Supposed to Be Embodied?Ken Aizawa - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):755-775.
    Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among (...)
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  46.  29
    Extended Sex: An Account of Sex for a More Just Society.Saray Ayala & Nadya Vasilyeva - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):725-742.
    We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity-sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent, but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as (...)
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  47.  68
    The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW]Ciano Aydin - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...)
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  48. Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition _nor_ the extended mind theses are in principle (...)
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  49.  85
    Radical Predictive Processing.Andy Clark - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53:3-27.
  50.  65
    What ‘Extended Me’ Knows.Andy Clark - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3757-3775.
    Arguments for the ‘extended mind’ seem to suggest the possibility of ‘extended knowers’—agents whose specifically epistemic virtues may depend on systems whose boundaries are not those of the brain or the biological organism. Recent discussions of this possibility invoke insights from virtue epistemology, according to which knowledge is the result of the application of some kind of cognitive skill or ability on the part of the agent. In this paper, I argue that there is a fundamental tension in these appeals (...)
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