Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why Digital Pictures Are Not Notational Representations.John Zeimbekis - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (4):449-453.
  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    This thesis explores the possibility of composite consciousness: phenomenally conscious states belonging to a composite being in virtue of the consciousness of, and relations among, its parts. We have no trouble accepting that a composite being has physical properties entirely in virtue of the physical properties of, and relations among, its parts. But a long­standing intuition holds that consciousness is different: my consciousness cannot be understood as a complex of interacting component consciousnesses belonging to parts of me. I ask why: (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Wilfrid Sellars.Willem deVries - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Overview of Wilfrid Sellars's philosophy.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Color and Cognitive Penetrability.John Zeimbekis - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.
    Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Phenomenal and Objective Size.John Zeimbekis - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
    Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (§2) We cannot (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sellars Without Homogeneity.Eric M. Rubenstein - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):47 – 71.
    Central to Wilfrid Sellars ' philosophical system is his belief that science's current ontology is inadequate as it fails to provide for an acceptable account of perceptual experience. Unfortunately, this remains the most puzzling plank in his philosophy. Sellars himself argues for this position via his wellknown example of a pink ice cube and its homogeneous colour. This homogeneity, says Sellars, bars the acceptance of science's present ontology of achromatic particles, and requires the introduction of items which are truly coloured. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color and Armstrong's Color Realism Under the Microscope.Dale Jacquette - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):389-406.
  • (A Laconic Exposition of) a Method by Which the Internal Compositional Features of Qualitative Experience Can Be Made Evident to Subjective Awareness.Mark Pestana - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):767-783.
    In this paper I explicate a technique which can be used to make subtle relational features of experience more evident to awareness. Results of this method could be employed to diffuse one intuition that drives the common critique of functionalist-information theoretic accounts of mind that "qualia" cannot be exhaustively characterized in information theoretic-functional terms. An intuition that commonly grounds this critique is that the qualitative aspects of experience do not entirely appear in consciousness as informational-functional structures. The first section of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Wilfrid Sellars.Jay Rosenberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations