Switch to: References

Citations of:

An Essay on Belief and Acceptance

New York: Clarendon Press (1992)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Explicating Objectual Understanding: Taking Degrees Seriously.Christoph Baumberger - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1:1-22.
    The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: An epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Nature of Doubt and a New Puzzle About Belief, Doubt, and Confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.
    Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Myth of Self-Deception.Steffen Borge - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-28.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.
    I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Belief Through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
  • Knowing That P Without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.
    According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the theory is true. On van Fraassen’s own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the realist. In (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.
    Deductive Cogency holds that the set of propositions towards which one has, or is prepared to have, a given type of propositional attitude should be consistent and closed under logical consequence. While there are many propositional attitudes that are not subject to this requirement, e.g. hoping and imagining, it is at least prima facie plausible that Deductive Cogency applies to the doxastic attitude involved in propositional knowledge, viz. belief. However, this thought is undermined by the well-known preface paradox, leading a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers.Liam Kofi Bright, Haixin Dang & Remco Heesen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252.
    This paper addresses the problem of judgment aggregation in science. How should scientists decide which propositions to assert in a collaborative document? We distinguish the question of what to write in a collaborative document from the question of collective belief. We argue that recent objections to the application of the formal literature on judgment aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata for an aggregation (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.
    Paradoxes have played an important role both in philosophy and in mathematics and paradox resolution is an important topic in both fields. Paradox resolution is deeply important because if such resolution cannot be achieved, we are threatened with the charge of debilitating irrationality. This is supposed to be the case for the following reason. Paradoxes consist of jointly contradictory sets of statements that are individually plausible or believable. These facts about paradoxes then give rise to a deeply troubling epistemic problem. (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Publicity of Belief, Epistemic Wrongs and Moral Wrongs.Michael J. Shaffer - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54.
    It is a commonplace belief that many beliefs, e.g. religious convictions, are a purely private matter, and this is meant in some way to serve as a defense against certain forms of criticism. In this paper it is argued that this thesis is false, and that belief is really often a public matter. This argument, the publicity of belief argument, depends on one of the most compelling and central thesis of Peircean pragmatism. This crucial thesis is that bona fide belief (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Definite Descriptions and the Gettier Example.Christoph Schmidt-Petri & London School of Economics and Political Science - 2002 - CPNSS Discussion Papers.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imaginative Transportation.Samuel Kampa - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):683-696.
    Actors, undercover investigators, and readers of fiction sometimes report “losing themselves” in the characters they imitate or read about. They speak of “taking on” or “assuming” the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings of someone else. I offer an account of this strange but familiar phenomenon—what I call imaginative transportation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):467-493.
  • Disagreement, Skepticism, and the Dialectical Conception of Justification.Markus Lammenranta - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):3-17.
    It is a common intuition that at least in some cases disagreement has skeptical consequences: the participants are not justified in persisting in their beliefs. I will argue that the currently popular non-dialectical and individualistic accounts of justification, such as evidentialism and reliabilism, cannot explain this intuition and defend the dialectical conception of justification that can explain it. I will also argue that this sort of justification is a necessary condition of knowledge by relying on Craig's genealogy of the concept (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
    In making assertions one takes on commitments to the consistency of what one asserts and to the logical consequences of what one asserts. Although there is no quick link between belief and assertion, the dialectical requirements on assertion feed back into normative constraints on those beliefs that constitute one's evidence. But if we are not certain of many of our beliefs and that uncertainty is modelled in terms of probabilities, then there is at least prima facie incoherence between the normative (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Passive Consensus and Active Commitment in the Sciences.Alban Bouvier - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):185-197.
    Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint commitment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 1998b). I argue that Gilbert's concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis on a close examination of Thagard's example, the discovery of Helicobacter (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Trust and the Doxastic Family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.
    This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts.Robert C. Pinto - 2003 - Argumentation 24 (2):227-252.
    This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • False Beliefs and Naive Beliefs: They Can Be Good for You.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.
    Naive physics beliefs can be systematically mistaken. They provide a useful test-bed because they are common, and also because their existence must rely on some adaptive advantage, within a given context. In the second part of the commentary we also ask questions about when a whole family of misbeliefs should be considered together as a single phenomenon.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Dynamics of Institutional Agreements.Andreas Herzig, Tiago de Lima & Emiliano Lorini - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):321 - 355.
    In this paper we investigate a logic for modelling individual and collective acceptances that is called acceptance logic. The logic has formulae of the form $A_{Gx} \phi $ reading 'if the agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together accept that φ'. We extend acceptance logic by two kinds of dynamic modal operators. The first kind are public announcements of the form x!ψ, meaning that the agents learn that ψ is the case in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Illusion of Conscious Will.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):197 - 213.
    Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.
    According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Scientific Discovery From the Perspective of Hypothesis Acceptance.Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S331-S341.
    A model of inductive inquiry is defined within the context of first‐order logic. The model conceives of inquiry as a game between Nature and a scientist. To begin the game, a nonlogical vocabulary is agreed upon by the two players, along with a partition of a class of countable structures for that vocabulary. Next, Nature secretly chooses one structure from some cell of the partition. She then presents the scientist with a sequence of facts about the chosen structure. With each (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Ángeles Eraña & Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:9-36.
    En este ensayo exploramos una perspectiva epistemológica en la que el elemento social y colectivo del conocimiento juega un papel fundamental en la explicación de su producción y transmisión. Primero presentamos y criticamos una posición individualista que ha sido dominante en la epistemología contemporánea y cuyas raíces pueden trazarse, al menos, hasta Descartes. Posteriormente introducimos y defendemos nuestra propia mirada, una en la que el conocimiento es un proceso constituido por un conjunto de actividades y prácticas que tiene un carácter (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Fictionalists Have Faith?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):215-232.
    According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This paper shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Some Artificial Intelligence Tools for Argument Evaluation: An Introduction.Douglas Walton - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):317-340.
    Even though tools for identifying and analyzing arguments are now in wide use in the field of argumentation studies, so far there is a paucity of resources for evaluating real arguments, aside from using deductive logic or Bayesian rules that apply to inductive arguments. In this paper it is shown that recent developments in artificial intelligence in the area of computational systems for modeling defeasible argumentation reveal a different approach that is currently making interesting progress. It is shown how these (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Democracy and Deliberation: Two Models of Public Justification.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2013 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política 2 (1).
    The commitment to provide an “adequate justification” of binding political decisions that is accepted or proves acceptable by all citizens concerned, appears to be one of the distinctive features of the idea of deliberation in the public arena as it is conceived by many deliberative conceptions of democracy. Having said that, however, not only is it not at all clear what exactly would qualify as “adequate justification” but also something even more basic: how are we to interpret the term “justification” (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • La Logique Peut-Elle Mouvoir L’Esprit?Pascal Engel - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):35-54.
    — J’entends bien, répondit Achille, agacé qu’on lui rappelle cet épisode humiliant. Mais tu fais comme si les logiciens avaient purement et simplement accepté la régression à l’infini de notre maître Lewis Carroll. Mais ils ont depuis longtemps diagnostiqué ce qui n’allait pas dans l’histoire dont nous étions jadis les infortunés protagonistes. Le problème, ont-ils noté, est que Lewis Carroll ne faisions pas la distinction entre une proposition vraie de la logique et une règle d’inférence. À partir du moment où (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Trust in the Guise of Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):156-172.
    What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels.Pierre LeMorvan - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.
    Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Maxwell’s Master Argument and Aberrant Theories.F. A. Muller - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1):131-156.
    Over the past years, in books and journals , N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen's view of science called Constructive Empiricism . This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell's reasoning will make it clear that neither is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Mister Bixby, Monsieur Bernard, and Some Other 19th Century Scientist–Philosophers on Knowledge-Based Actions.Ulrich Charpa - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):257 - 268.
    Following Mr. Bixby and some other 19th century scientist-philosophers such as Claude Bernard, relevant scientific actions should, as a matter of primary importance, be explained with reference to the competence and not to the intentions of those involved. The background is a reliabilist virtue approach - a widespread tendency in 19th century epistemology and philosophy of science. Bixby's approach includes a critique of some constructivist arguments and establishes a mutually supportive connection to conceptions of scientific progress.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mister Bixby, Monsieur Bernard, and Some Other 19th Century Scientist–Philosophers on Knowledge-Based Actions.Ulrich Charpa - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):257-268.
    Following Mr. Bixby and some other 19th century scientist-philosophers such as Claude Bernard, relevant scientific actions should, as a matter of primary importance, be explained with reference to the competence and not to the intentions of those involved. The background is a reliabilist virtue approach - a widespread tendency in 19th century epistemology and philosophy of science. Bixby's approach includes a critique of some constructivist arguments and establishes a mutually supportive connection to conceptions of scientific progress.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Six Levels of Mentality.Leslie Stevenson - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.
    Examination of recent debates about belief shows the need to distinguish: (a) non-linguistic informational states in animal perception; (b) the uncritical use of language, e.g. by children; (c) adult humans' reasoned judgments. If we also distinguish between mind-directed and object-directed mental states, we have: Perceptual 'beliefs' of animals and infants about their material environment. 'Beliefs' of animals and infants about the mental states of others. Linguistically-expressible beliefs about the world, resulting from e.g. the uncritical tendency to believe what we are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Why Believe the Truth? Shah and Velleman on the Aim of Belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.
    The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Practical Belief and Philosophical Theory.Philip Pettit - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):15 – 33.
    Philosophy invariably starts with the attempt to spell out ideas and beliefs that we already hold, whether on topics like time or causality, colour or value, consciousness or free will, democracy or justice or freedom. It may go well beyond such pre-philosophical assumptions in its further developments, regimenting them in unexpected ways, revising them on novel lines, even discarding them entirely in favour of other views. But philosophy always begins with the articulation of ordinary ideas and beliefs. This is where (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions.David M. Godden & Nicholas Griffin - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.
    This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
    This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Walker on the Voluntariness of Judgment.Christian Stein - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):175 – 186.
    In his paper 'The Voluntariness of Judgment' Mark Thomas Walker claims that judgments are voluntary acts. According to Walker, theoretical reasoning can be seen as an instance of practical reasoning, and the outcomes of practical reasoning are actions. There are two reasons why Walker's argument does not establish this conclusion: (i) There are non-reflective judgments which cannot reasonably be described as instances of practical reasoning; Walker's argument does not apply to these judgments, (ii) If one judges that p as a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
    It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement, such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Remembering Without Knowing.Sven Bernecker - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
    This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Belief, Information and Reasoning.Bruno Whittle - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.
    Here are two plausible ideas about belief. First: beliefs are our means of storing information. Second: if we believe something, then we are willing to use it in reasoning. But in this paper I introduce a puzzle that seems to show that these cannot both be right. The solution, I argue, is a new picture, on which there is a kind of belief for each idea. An account of these two kinds of belief is offered in terms of two components: (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Norms of Acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.
    An area in the theory of action that has received little attention is how mental agency and world-directed agency interact. The purpose of the present contribution is to clarify the rational conditions of such interaction, through an analysis of the central case of acceptance. There are several problems with the literature about acceptance. First, it remains unclear how a context of acceptance is to be construed. Second, the possibility of conjoining, in acceptance, an epistemic component, which is essentially mind-to-world, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations