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  1. Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):563-579.
    This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it is contended that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. However, it is also true that it appears to be the case that it is still (...)
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  • From Tools to Theories: A Heuristic of Discovery in Cognitive Psychology.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1991 - Psychological Review 98 (2):254-267.
  • Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulfordb - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
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  • Is the Mind Bayesian? The Case for Agnosticism.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...)
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  • How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant.Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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  • Decision Science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories.Nils-Eric Sahlin, Annika Wallin & Johannes Persson - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):129-143.
    The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, (...)
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  • Rationality and Uncertainty.Amartya Sen - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (2):109-127.
  • An Informal Logic Bibliography.Hans V. Hansen - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (3).
  • What Are the Foundations of Normative Theories About Human Reasoning?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):312-313.
  • Cohen on Cognitive Competence: Can Human Rationality Be Philosophically Demonstrated?James E. Taylor - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):311-312.
  • Discovery in Cognitive Psychology: New Tools Inspire New Theories.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1992 - Science in Context 5 (2):329-350.
  • False Memories of the Future: A Critique of the Applications of Probabilistic Reasoning to the Study of Cognitive Processes.Mihnea Moldoveanu & Ellen Langer - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (2):358-375.
  • Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
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  • Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
    We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we (...)
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  • Eight Theses Reflecting on Stephen Toulmin.John Woods - unknown
    I discuss eight theses espoused or occasioned by Toulmin: The validity standard is nearly always the wrong standard for real-life reasoning. Little in good reasoning is topic neutral. The probability calculus distorts much probabilistic reasoning. Scant resources have a benign influence on human reasoning. Theoretical progress and conceptual change are connected. Logic should investigate the cognitive aspects of reasoning and arguing. Ideal models are unsuitable for normativity. The role of the Can Do Principle.
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  • The Controversy About Irrationality.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):510.
  • Can Irrationality Be Intelligently Discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
  • A Theory of Probability Should Tutor Our Intuitions.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):508.
  • Human Inference: The Notion of Reasonable Rationality.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):507.
  • Can Philosophy Resolve Empirical Issues?Clifford R. Mynatt, Ryan D. Tweney & Michael E. Doherty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):506.
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  • Who Commits the Base Rate Fallacy?Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):502.
  • Norms, Competence, and the Explanation of Reasoning.Gary S. Kahn & Lance J. Rips - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):501.
  • Inductive Reasoning: Competence or Skill?Christopher Jepson, David H. Krantz & Richard E. Nisbett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):494.
  • Intuition and Inconsistency.Richard E. Grandy - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):494.
  • Is Irrationality Systematic?Robyn M. Dawes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):491.
  • Expert Intuitions and the Interpretation of Social Psychological Experiments.André Gallois & Michael Siegal - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):492.
  • The Plasticity of Human Rationality.Norman Daniels & George E. Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):490.
  • The Epistemological Status of Lay Intuition.Christopher Cherniak - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):489.
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  • Discrepancies Between Human Behavior and Formal Theories of Rationality: The Incompleteness of Bayesian Probability Logic.Lea Brilmayer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):488.
  • The Rationality of the Scientist: Toward Reconciliation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):487.
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  • Can Irrationality Be Discussed Accurately?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):736.
  • Evaluating Conditional Arguments with Uncertain Premises.Raymond S. Nickerson, Daniel H. Barch & Susan F. Butler - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (1):48-71.
    ABSTRACTTreating conditionals as probabilistic statements has been referred to as a defining feature of the “new paradigm” in cognitive psychology. Doing so is attractive for several reasons, but it complicates the problem of assessing the merits of conditional arguments. We consider several variables that relate to judging the persuasiveness of conditional arguments with uncertain premises. We also explore ways of judging the consistency of people's beliefs as represented by components of conditional arguments. Experimental results provide evidence that inconsistencies in beliefs (...)
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  • On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy.Rodrigo Moro - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy (...)
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  • Six Types of Fallaciousness: Toward a Realistic Theory of Logical Criticism. [REVIEW]Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 1987 - Argumentation 1 (3):263-282.
    I begin by formulating the problem of the nature of fallacy in terms of the logic of the negative evaluation of argument, that is, in terms of a theory of logical criticism; here I discuss several features of my approach and several advantages vis-à-vis other approaches; a main feature of my approach is the concern to avoid both formalist and empiricist excesses. I then define six types of fallaciousness, labeled formal, explanatory, presuppositional, positive, semantical, and persuasive; they all involve arguments (...)
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  • A Reply to Stein.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):173 - 176.