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  1. Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on The Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on The Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, reexamining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  • The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  • Naive Physics.Barry Smith & Roberto Casati - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):227 – 247.
    The project of a 'naive physics' has been the subject of attention in recent years above all in the artificial intelligence field, in connection with work on common-sense reasoning, perceptual representation and robotics. The idea of a theory of the common-sense world is however much older than this, having its roots not least in the work of phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists such as K hler, Husserl, Schapp and Gibson. This paper seeks to show how contemporary naive physicists can profit from (...)
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  • Logical Space and the Space of Sight: The Relevance of Wittgenstein's Arguments to Recent Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.Ludovic Soutif - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):501-536.
    ABSTRACT: In this article, I show and discuss the relevance of Wittgenstein's arguments as to the spatial structure of sight to recent issues in the philosophy of mind. The first, bearing upon the dimensionality of the manifolds at play in depiction, plays a critical role in Clark's attempt to provide an independent account of qualia and of their differentiative properties. The second, pertaining to the properly spatial structure formed by the data of sight, is explicitly appealed to in the debate (...)
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  • Cognitive Representation and the Process-Architecture Distinction.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):154-169.
  • Cognition is Not Computation, for the Reasons That Computers Don't Solve the Mind-Body Problems.Walter B. Weimer - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-153.
  • Functional Architectures for Cognition: Are Simple Inferences Possible?Steven W. Zucker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):153-154.
  • Computation and Symbolization.William E. Smythe - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):151-152.
  • Computation Without Representation.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-152.
  • Functional Architecture and Model Validation.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):150-151.
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  • Pylyshyn and Perception.William T. Powers - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):148-149.
  • Penetrating the Impenetrable.Georges Rey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):149-150.
  • Criteria of Cognitive Impenetrability.Robert C. Moore - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-147.
  • Explanations in Theories of Language and of Imagery.Steven Pinker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):147-148.
  • Computation, Consciousness and Cognition.George A. Miller - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-146.
  • Cognitive Penetrability: Let Us Not Forget About Memory.James R. Miller - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-146.
  • Functional Architecture and Free Will.Henry E. Kyburg - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):143-146.
  • Reductionism and Cognitive Flexibility.Frank Keil - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):141-142.
  • The Elusive Visual Processing Mode: Implications of the Architecture/Algorithm Distinction.Roberta L. Klatzky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):142-143.
  • The Reification of the Mind-Body Problem?Stewart H. Hulse - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):139-140.
  • The Borders of Cognition.Earl Hunt - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):140-141.
  • Psychology and Computational Architecture.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):138-139.
  • Computation, Cognition, and Representation.John Hell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):139-139.
  • In Defence of the Armchair.Michael Fortescue - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):135-136.
  • Human and Computer Rules and Representations Are Not Equivalent.Stephen Grossberg - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):136-138.
  • A Remark on the Completeness of the Computational Model of Mind.William Demopoulos - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):135-135.
  • Plasticity: Conceptual and Neuronal.Paul M. Churchland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):133-134.
  • From Computational Metaphor to Consensual Algorithms.Kenneth Mark Colby - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):134-135.
  • Neuroscience and Psychology: Should the Labor Be Divided?Patricia Smith Churchland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):133-133.
  • Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
    The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...)
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