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  1. Debate: Capabilities versus opportunities for well-being.Peter Vallentyne - 2005 - Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (3):359–371.
    Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have argued that justice is concerned, at least in part, with the distribution of capabilities (opportunities to function). Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, and John Roemer have argued that justice is concerned with something like the distribution of opportunities for well-being. I argue that, although some versions of the capability view are incompatible with some versions of the opportunity for well-being view, the most plausible version of the capability view is identical to a slight generalization of (...)
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  • Poverty, well-being, and gender: What counts, who’s heard?Susan Moller Okin - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):280–316.
  • Democratic epistemology and democratic morality: the appeal and challenges of Peircean pragmatism.Annabelle Lever & Clayton Chin - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (4):432-453.
    Does the wide distribution of political power in democracies, relative to other modes of government, result in better decisions? Specifically, do we have any reason to believe that they are better qualitatively – more reasoned, better supported by the available evidence, more deserving of support – than those which have been made by other means? In order to answer this question we examine the recent effort by Talisse and Misak to show that democracy is epistemically justified. Highlighting the strengths and (...)
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  • Democratic epistemology and democratic morality: the appeal and challenges of Peircean pragmatism.Annabelle Lever & Clayton Chin - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (4):432-453.
    Does the wide distribution of political power in democracies, relative to other modes of government, result in better decisions? Specifically, do we have any reason to believe that they are better qualitatively – more reasoned, better supported by the available evidence, more deserving of support – than those which have been made by other means? In order to answer this question we examine the recent effort by Talisse and Misak to show that democracy is epistemically justified. Highlighting the strengths and (...)
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  • Capabilities and freedom.Alexander Kaufman - 2006 - Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3):289–300.
  • Negative and Positive Genetic Interventions: Is There a Moral Boundary?Norman Daniels - 1998 - Science in Context 11 (3-4):439-453.
    The ArgumentSome have claimed that negative genetic interventions are morally permissible while positive ones are not, but the distinction cannot be used to draw this moral boundary. Underlying the negative/positive distinction is a distinction between treatment and enhancement. The treatment/enhancement distinction at best provides an imperfect guide to which health care services we are obliged to provide and which we are not. It offers only some “warning flags” to help us think about what is permissible or not.
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  • Elements of a theory of human rights.S. E. N. Amartya - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (4):315–356.