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  1. A Puzzle About Concept Possession.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):1-22.
    To have a propositional attitude, a thinker must possess the concepts included in its content. Surprisingly, this rather trivial principle refl ects badly on many theories of concept possession because, in its light, they seem to require too much. To solve this problem, I point out an ambiguity in attributions of the form 'S possesses the concept of Fs'. There is an undemanding sense which is involved in the given principle, whereas the theoretical claims concern a stronger sense which can (...)
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  • Evidence of Coordination as a Cure for Concept Eliminativism.Andrea Scarantino - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):223-224.
    I argue that Machery stacks the deck against hybrid theories of concepts by relying on an unduly restrictive understanding of coordination between concept parts. Once a less restrictive notion of coordination is introduced, the empirical case for hybrid theories of concepts becomes stronger, and the appeal of concept eliminativism weaker.
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  • Prototype Theory and Compositionality.H. Kamp - 1995 - Cognition 57 (2):129-191.
  • Conjunctions of Social Categories Considered From Different Points of View.James A. Hampton, Margaret Dillane, Laura Oren & Louise Worgan - 2011 - Anthropology and Philosophy 10:31-57.
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  • Typicality, Graded Membership, and Vagueness.James A. Hampton - 2007 - Cognitive Science 31 (3):355-384.
  • Efficient Creativity: Constraint‐Guided Conceptual Combination.Fintan J. Costello & Mark T. Keane - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (2):299-349.
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  • Note on the Integration of Prototype Theory and Fuzzy-Set Theory.Gy Fuhrmann - 1991 - Synthese 86 (1):1 - 27.
    Many criticisms of prototype theory and/or fuzzy-set theory are based on the assumption that category representativeness (or typicality) is identical with fuzzy membership. These criticisms also assume that conceptual combination and logical rules (all in the Aristotelian sense) are the appropriate criteria for the adequacy of the above “fuzzy typicality”. The present paper discusses these assumptions following the line of their most explicit and most influential expression by Osheron and Smith (1981). Several arguments are made against the above identification, the (...)
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  • Conceptual Combination: Extension and Intension. Commentary on Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo.James A. Hampton - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):53-57.
    Aerts et al. provide a valuable model to capture the interactive nature of conceptual combination in conjunctions and disjunctions. The commentary provides a brief review of the interpretation of these interactions that has been offered in the literature, and argues for a closer link between the more traditional account in terms of concept intensions, and the parameters that emerge from the fitting of the Quantum Probability model.
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  • Conceptual Combination with Prototype Concepts.Edward E. Smith & Daniel N. Osherson - 1984 - Cognitive Science 8 (4):337-361.
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  • On Prototypes as Defaults.Martin L. Jönsson & James A. Hampton - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):913-923.
  • Problems of Context and Knowledge.Jacques Jayez - 1989 - Argumentation 3 (3):303-319.
    In spite of alleged differences in purpose, descriptive and computational linguistics share many problems, due to the fact that any precise study on language needs some form of knowledge representation. This constraint is mostly apparent when interpretation of sentences takes into account elements of the so-called “context”. The parametrization of context, i.e. the explicit listing of features relevant to some intepretation task, is difficult because it requires flexible formal structures for understanding or simulating inferential behaviour, as well as a large (...)
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  • Compounding as Abstract Operation in Semantic Space: Investigating Relational Effects Through a Large-Scale, Data-Driven Computational Model.Marco Marelli, Christina L. Gagné & Thomas L. Spalding - 2017 - Cognition 166:207-224.
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  • Reasoning, Rationality, and Architectural Resolution.Brian J. Scholl - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):451-470.
    Recent evidence suggests that performance on reasoning tasks may reflect the operation of a number of distinct cognitive mechanisms and processes. This paper explores the implications of this view of the mind for the descriptive and normative assessment of reasoning. I suggest that descriptive questions such as “Are we equipped to reason using rule X?” and normative questions such as “Are we rational?” are obsolete—they do not possess a fine enough grain of architectural resolution to accurately characterize the mind. I (...)
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  • Fuzziness of Concepts and Concepts of Fuzziness.Gy Fuhrmann - 1988 - Synthese 75 (3):349 - 372.
    It has been a vexing question in recent years whether concepts are fuzzy. In this paper several views on the fuzziness of concepts are pointed out to have stemmed from dubious concepts of fuzziness. The underlying notions of the roles feasibly played byprototype, set, andprobability in modeling concepts strongly suggest that the controversy originates from a vague relation between intuitive and mathematical ideas in the cognitive sciences. It is argued that the application of fuzzy sets cannot resolve this vagueness since (...)
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  • Comprehending Complex Concepts.Gregory L. Murphy - 1988 - Cognitive Science 12 (4):529-562.
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  • Why Stereotypes Don’T Even Make Good Defaults.Andrew C. Connolly, Jerry A. Fodor, Lila R. Gleitman & Henry Gleitman - 2007 - Cognition 103 (1):1-22.
  • Combining Prototypes: A Selective Modification Model.Edward E. Smith, Daniel N. Osherson, Lance J. Rips & Margaret Keane - 1988 - Cognitive Science 12 (4):485-527.
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  • Essentialism, Word Use, and Concepts.Nick Braisby, Bradley Franks & James Hampton - 1996 - Cognition 59 (3):247-274.
  • Concepts and Inference.Jonathan ST B. T. Evans - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (1-2):29-34.
  • Concepts and Inference.Jonathan S. B. T. Evans - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (1-2):29-34.
  • Die Tripelstruktur der Begriffe.W. Balzer & V. Kuznetsov - 2010 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (1):21 - 43.
    Wir stellen ein präzises Modell der wissenschaftlichen Begriffs-theorie vor, in dem die Beschreibungs-, die Wirklichkeits- und die mengentheoretische Ebene verknüpft werden. Einerseits wird ein allgemeiner Rahmen für die Gesamtheit der Begriffe, andererseits die „lokale” Struktur eines Begriffs beschrieben. Wir spezialisieren diesen Rahmen auf wissenschaftliche Begriffe, wissenschaftliche Theorien, und auf die zugehörigen strukturalistischen, wissenschaftstheoretischen Konstruktionen. We introduce a precise model for the theory of concepts in philosophy of science. In this model we connect the level of description, the level of reality (...)
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  • “Prototypes” and “Fuzziness” in the Logic of Concepts.Gy Fuhrmann - 1988 - Synthese 75 (3):317 - 347.
    Prototypes and fuzziness are regarded in this paper as fundamental phenomena in the inherent logic of concepts whose relationship, however, has not been sufficiently clarified. Therefore, modifications are proposed in the definition of both. Prototypes are defined as the elements possessing maximal degree of membership in the given category such thatthis membership has maximal cognitive efficiency in representing theelement. A modified fuzzy set (m-fuzzy set) is defined on aclass (possibly self-contradictory collection) such that its core (the collection of elements with (...)
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