Citations of work:

Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction.

9 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  3
    Developing Organizational Competences for Conflict Management: The Use of the Prisoner's Dilemma in Higher Education.Andreina Bruno, Giuseppina Dell'Aversana & Gloria Guidetti - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  23
    Satisficing, Preferences, and Social Interaction: A New Perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  2
    Testing Theories About Ethnic Markers.Niels Holm Jensen, Michael Bang Petersen, Henrik Høgh-Olesen & Michael Ejstrup - 2015 - Human Nature 26 (2):210-234.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  96
    Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models From Logical Formulas.Sujata Ghosh, Ben Meijering & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (1):1-29.
    This paper presents an attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of strategic reasoning in games. There have been extensive formal debates about the merits of the principle of backward induction among game theorists and logicians. Experimental economists and psychologists have shown that human subjects, perhaps due to their bounded resources, do not always follow the backward induction strategy, leading to unexpected outcomes. Recently, based on an eye-tracking study, it has turned out that even human subjects who (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  39
    Perspective-Taking and Depth of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Sequential-Move Games.Jun Zhang, Trey Hedden & Adrian Chia - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (3):560-573.
    Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual’s mental states to plan one’s action and to anticipate others’ actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.
    This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  71
    Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  20
    Both Your Intention and Mine Are Reflected in the Kinematics of My Reach-to-Grasp Movement.Cristina Becchio, Luisa Sartori, Maria Bulgheroni & Umberto Castiello - 2008 - Cognition 106 (2):894-912.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  9.  45
    Initiating Coordination.Paul Weirich - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):790-801.
    How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. ‡I thank the audience at my paper's presentation at the 2006 PSA meeting for many insightful points. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211; e-mail: WeirichP@missouri.edu.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations