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  1. Where Are Virtues?Joshua August Skorburg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2331-2349.
    This paper argues that the question, ‘where are virtues?’ demands a response from virtue theorists. Despite the polarizing nature of debates about the relevance of empirical work in psychology for virtue theory, I first show that there is widespread agreement about the underlying structure of virtue. Namely, that virtues are comprised of cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show that there are well-developed arguments that cognitive processes can extend beyond the agent. Then, I show that there are similarly well-developed arguments (...)
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  • The Narrative Self, Distributed Memory, and Evocative Objects.Richard Heersmink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1829-1849.
    In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of artifacts (...)
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  • Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian Account.Thomas Szanto - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):503-527.
    Recently, an increasing body of work from sociology, social psychology, and social ontology has been devoted to collective emotions. Rather curiously, however, pressing epistemological and especially normative issues have received almost no attention. In particular, there has been a strange silence on whether one can share emotions with individuals or groups who are not aware of such sharing, or how one may identify this, and eventually identify specific norms of emotional sharing. In this paper, I shall address this set of (...)
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  • When Affective Relation Weighs More Than the Mug Handle: Investigating Affective Affordances.Marta Caravà & Claudia Scorolli - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self.Joel Krueger - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):597-609.
    A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue—along with others in phenomenological psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia (...)
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  • Varieties of the Extended Self.Richard Heersmink - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103001.
    This article provides an overview and analysis of recent work on the extended self, demonstrating that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. First, it distinguishes the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self. Second, it surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character traits can be extended and what that implies for the boundaries of selves. It also reviews and responds to various criticisms and (...)
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  • The Narrative Self, Distributed Memory, and Evocative Objects.Richard Heersmink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1829-1849.
    In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of (...)
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  • What is an affective artifact? A further development in situated affectivity.Giulia Piredda - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):549-567.
    In this paper I would like to propose the notion of “affective artifact”, building on an analogy with theories of cognitive artifacts and referring to the development of a situated affective science. Affective artifacts are tentatively defined as objects that have the capacity to alter the affective condition of an agent, and that in some cases play an important role in defining that agent’s self. The notion of affective artifacts will be presented by means of examples supported by empirical findings, (...)
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  • What Can the Concept of Affective Scaffolding Do for Us?Jussi A. Saarinen - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):820-839.
    The concept of affective scaffolding designates the various ways in which we manipulate the environment to influence our affective lives. In this article, I present a constructive critique of recen...
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  • Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge. pp. 197-206.
  • Does Functionalism Entail Extended Mind?Kengo Miyazono - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3523-3541.
    In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in (...)
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  • A Pragma-Enactivist Approach to the Affectively Extended Self.Giulia Piredda & Laura Candiotto - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (36).
    In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic re-shaping and maintenance of the self is mediated first by affective interactions. We initially consider the different variations on the conception of the extended self that have been already proposed in the literature. We then propose our alternative, contextualising it within the current debate on situated affectivity. While the idea (...)
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  • Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
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  • Extended Emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  • From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.Marcin Miłkowski, Robert Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska, Aleksandra Przegalińska, Tadeusz Zawidzki, Joel Krueger, Adam Gies, Marek McGann, Łukasz Afeltowicz, Witold Wachowski, Fredrik Stjernberg, Victor Loughlin & Mateusz Hohol - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...)
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  • Musical Manipulations and the Emotionally Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2014 - Empirical Musicology Review 9 (3-4):208-212.
    I respond to Kersten’s criticism in his article “Music and Cognitive Extension” of my approach to the musically extended emotional mind in Krueger (2014). I specify how we manipulate—and in so doing, integrate with—music when, as active listeners, we become part of a musically extended cognitive system. I also indicate how Kersten’s account might be enriched by paying closer attention to the way that music functions as an environmental artifact for emotion regulation.
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  • Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche.Joel Krueger - 2015 - Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 14 (3):43-62.
    Building on Elliot and SilvermanÕs (2015) embodied and enactive approach to musicing, I argue for an extended approach: namely, the idea that music can function as an environmental scaffolding supporting the development of various experiences and embodied practices that would otherwise remain inaccessible. I focus especially on the materiality of music. I argue that one of the central ways we use music, as a material resource, is to manipulate social spaceÑand in so doing, manipulate our emotions. Acts of musicing, thought (...)
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  • Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack.Jan Slaby - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    In view of the philosophical problems that vex the debate on situated affectivity, it can seem wise to focus on simple cases. Accordingly, theorists often single out scenarios in which an individual employs a device in order to enhance their emotional experience, or to achieve new kinds of experience altogether, such as playing an instrument, going to the movies or sporting a fancy handbag. I argue that this narrow focus on cases that fit a ‘user/resource model’ tends to channel attention (...)
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  • Enactivism, Other Minds, and Mental Disorders.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" (DSP): the (...)
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  • Music as Affective Scaffolding.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In David Clarke, Ruth Herbert & Eric Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    For 4E cognitive science, minds are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. Proponents observe that we regularly ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and world: we use gestures and calculators to augment mathematical reasoning, and smartphones and search engines as memory aids. I argue that music is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. Via this offloading, music scaffolds access to new forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus on music’s capacity to scaffold emotional consciousness, including the self-regulative processes constitutive of emotional (...)
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  • At Home in and Beyond Our Skin: Posthuman Embodiment in Film and Television.Joel Krueger - 2015 - In Hauskeller Michael, Carbonell Curtis D. & Philbeck Thomas D. (eds.), Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 172-181.
    Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, simultaneously “animal and machine” abound. Most of us immediately think of iconic characters like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s relentless cyborg assassin in the Terminator series or Peter Weller’s crime-fighting cyborg police officer in Robocop (1987). Or perhaps we recall the many cyborgs populating the Dr. Who, Star Trek, and Star Wars television series and films—including Darth Vader, surely the most famous cinematic cyborg of all time. But lesser-known explorations of cybernetic embodiment (...)
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  • The Best Memories: Identity, Narrative, and Objects.Richard Heersmink & Christopher Jade McCarroll - 2019 - In Timothy Shanahan & Paul Smart (eds.), Blade Runner 2049: A Philosophical Exploration. Routledge. pp. 87-107.
    Memory is everywhere in Blade Runner 2049. From the dead tree that serves as a memorial and a site of remembrance (“Who keeps a dead tree?”), to the ‘flashbulb’ memories individuals hold about the moment of the ‘blackout’, when all the electronic stores of data were irretrievably erased (“everyone remembers where they were at the blackout”). Indeed, the data wiped out in the blackout itself involves a loss of memory (“all our memory bearings from the time, they were all damaged (...)
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  • Extended Mind and Religious Cognition.Joel Krueger - 2016 - Religion: Mental Religion. Part of the Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Religion Series.
    The extended mind thesis claims that mental states need not be confined to the brain or even the biological borders of the subject. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have in recent years debated the plausibility of this thesis, growing an immense body of literature. Yet despite its many supporters, there have been relatively few attempts to apply the thesis to religious studies, particularly studies of religious cognition. In this essay, I indicate how various dimensions of religious cognition might be thought of (...)
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  • Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin.Giovanna Colombetti, Joel Krueger & Tom Roberts - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:1-2.
  • Embodiment, Sociality, and the Life Shaping Thesis.Michelle Maiese - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):353-374.
    What Kyselo calls the “body-social problem” concerns whether to individuate the human self in terms of its bodily aspects or social aspects. In her view, either approach risks privileging one dimension while reducing the other to a mere contextual element. However, she proposes that principles from enactivism can help us to find a middle ground and solve the body-social problem. Here Kyselo looks to the notions of “needful freedom” and "individuation through and from a world" and extends them from the (...)
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  • Can the Mind Be Embodied, Enactive, Affective, a Nd Extended?Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):343-361.
    In recent years, a growing number of thinkers have begun to challenge the long-held view that the mind is neurally realized. One strand of critique comes from work on extended cognition, a second comes from research on embodied cognition, and a third comes from enactivism. I argue that theorists who embrace the claim that the mind is fully embodied and enactive cannot consistently also embrace the extended mind thesis. This is because once one takes seriously the central tenets of enactivism, (...)
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  • On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
    Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine (...)
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  • Paintings as Solid Affective Scaffolds.Jussi Antti Saarinen - 2019 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (1):67-77.
    We humans continuously reshape the environment to alter, enhance, and sustain our affective lives. This two-way modification has been discussed in recent philosophy of mind as affective scaffolding, wherein scaffolding quite literally means that our affective states are enabled and supported by environmental resources such as material objects, other people, and physical spaces. In this article, I will argue that under certain conditions paintings function as noteworthy affective scaffolds to their creators. To expound this idea, I will begin with a (...)
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  • Out of Our Skulls: How the Extended Mind Thesis Can Extend Psychiatry.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1160-1174.
    The thesis that mental states extend beyond the skull, otherwise known as the extended mind thesis, has attracted considerable philosophical attention and support. It has also been accused of lacking practical import. At the same time, the field of psychiatry has remained largely unacquainted with ExM, tending to rely instead upon what ExM proponents would consider to be outdated models of the mind. ExM and psychiatry, therefore, have much to offer one another, but the connection between the two has remained (...)
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  • Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Enactive Affectivity, Extended.Giovanna Colombetti - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):445-455.
    In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo, that the enactive approach allows living systems to “extend”. Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also (...)
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  • Emotion.R. De Sousa - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3.
     
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