Citations of work:

Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath (2014). Having False Reasons.

7 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

  1.  1
    Empirical Justification and Defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Two truisms about empirical justification are that experience plays a crucial role in it and that it is defeasible. There are, of course, different ways of developing these truisms into philosophical theories. I favor one particular view about the role of experience in empirical justification which may be thought to lead to problems in accommodating its defeasibility. My aim in this paper is to argue that the problems are illusory, based on an entrenched misconception how defeaters work.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  13
    Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):95-112.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Perceptual Reasons.Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.
    The paper is an opinionated tour of the literature on the reasons for which we hold beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, which I call ‘operative epistemic reasons’. After drawing some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of operative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states. I recommend a pluralist non-mentalist view that takes seriously the variety of operative epistemic reasons ascriptions and allows these reasons to be both propositions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  5.  60
    Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  6.  29
    Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  44
    Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):400-415.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations