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The T-schema is not a logical truth

Analysis 72 (2):231-239 (2012)

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  1. An Update of Tarski: Two Usages of the Word “True”.Zhen Zhao - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (3):505-523.
    This paper is based on Tarski’s theory of truth. The purpose of this paper is to solve the liar paradox and keep both of the deductive power of classical logic and the expressive power of the word “true” in natural language. The key of this paper lies in the distinction between the predicate usage and the operator usage of the word “true”. The truth operator is primarily used for characterizing the semantics of the language. Then, we do not need the (...)
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  • The Tarski T-Schema is a Tautology (Literally).Edward N. Zalta - 2013 - Analysis (1):ant099.
    The Tarski T-Schema has a propositional version. If we use ϕ as a metavariable for formulas and use terms of the form that-ϕ to denote propositions, then the propositional version of the T-Schema is: that-ϕ is true if and only if ϕ. For example, that Cameron is Prime Minister is true if and only if Cameron is Prime Minister. If that-ϕ is represented formally as [λ ϕ], then the T-Schema can be represented as the 0-place case of λ-Conversion. If we (...)
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  • The Tarski T-Schema is a Tautology.E. N. Zalta - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):5-11.
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  • Why Aboutness Matters: Meta-Fictionalism as a Case Study.Matteo Plebani - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (3):1177-1186.
    Recent work in the philosophy of language attempts to elucidate the elusive notion of aboutness. A natural question concerning such a project has to do with its motivation: why is the notion of aboutness important? Stephen Yablo offers an interesting answer: taking into consideration not only the conditions under which a sentence is true, but also what a sentence is about opens the door to a new style of criticism of certain philosophical analyses. We might criticize the analysis of a (...)
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  • The Inexpressibility of Validity.Julien Murzi - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):65-81.
    Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem comes in two versions: that no consistent theory which interprets Robinson's Arithmetic (Q) can prove all instances of the T-Scheme and hence define truth; and that no such theory, if sound, can even express truth. In this note, I prove corresponding limitative results for validity. While Peano Arithmetic already has the resources to define a predicate expressing logical validity, as Jeff Ketland has recently pointed out (2012, Validity as a primitive. Analysis 72: 421-30), no theory (...)
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  • A Way Out of the Preface Paradox?Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):ant091.
    The thesis defended in this article is that by uttering or publishing a great many declarative sentences in assertoric mode, one does not actually assert that their conjunction is true – one rather asserts that the vast majority of these sentences are true. Accordingly, the belief that is expressed thereby is the belief that the vast majority of these sentences are true. In the article, we make this proposal precise, we explain the context-dependency of belief that corresponds to it, we (...)
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  • An Argument From Proof Theory Against Implicit Conventionalism.Rea Golan - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Conventionalism about logic is the view that logical principles hold in virtue of some linguistic conventions. According to explicit conventionalism, these conventions have to be stipulated explicitly. Explicit conventionalism is subject to a famous criticism by Quine, who accused it of leading to an infinite regress. In response to the criticism, several authors have suggested reconstructing conventionalism as implicit in our linguistic behaviour. In this paper, drawing on a distinction from proof theory between derivable and admissible rules, I argue that (...)
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  • DEFLATIONARY TRUTH: CONSERVATIVITY OR LOGICALITY?Henri Galinon - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):268-274.
    It has been argued in the literature that the deflationists’ thesis about the dispensability of truth as an explanatory notion forces them to adopt a conservative theory of truth. I suggest that the deflationists’ claim that the notion of truth is akin to a logical notion should be taken more seriously. This claim casts some doubts on the adequacy of the conservativity requirement, while it also calls for further investigation to assess its philosophical plausibility.
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  • Logical Nihilism and the Logic of ‘Prem’.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    As the final component of a chain of reasoning intended to take us all the way to logical nihilism, Russell (2018) presents the atomic sentence ‘prem’ which is supposed to be true when featuring as premise in an argument and false when featuring as conclusion in an argument. Such a sentence requires a non-reflexive logic and an endnote by Russell (2018) could easily leave the reader with the impression that going non-reflexive suffices for logical nihilism. This paper shows how one (...)
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  • The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):152-171.
    It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides (...)
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  • Pinocchio Against the Semantic Hierarchies.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):817-830.
    The Liar paradox is an obstacle to a theory of truth, but a Liar sentence need not contain a semantic predicate. The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, was the first published paradox to show this. Pinocchio’s nose grows if, and only if, what Pinocchio is saying is untrue. What happens if Pinocchio says that his nose is growing? Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith : 212-5, 2010) posed the Pinocchio paradox against the Tarskian-Kripkean solutions to the Liar paradox that use language hierarchies. (...)
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  • There is No Paradox of Logical Validity.Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Logica Universalis 8 (3-4):447-467.
    A number of authors have argued that Peano Arithmetic supplemented with a logical validity predicate is inconsistent in much the same manner as is PA supplemented with an unrestricted truth predicate. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, there is no genuine paradox of logical validity—a completely general logical validity predicate can be coherently added to PA, and the resulting system is consistent. In addition, this observation lead to a number of novel, and important, insights into the nature (...)
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  • Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
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