Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Foundationalism and Coherentism Reconsidered.Dirk Koppelberg - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (3):255-283.
  • Chisholm's Approach to Scepticism.Douglas Odegard - 1981 - Metaphilosophy 12 (1):7–12.
  • The Two Faces of Quine's Naturalism.Susan Haack - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):335 - 356.
    Quine's naturalized epistemology is ambivalent between a modest naturalism according to which epistemology is an a posteriori discipline, an integral part of the web of empirical belief, and a scientistic naturalism according to which epistemology is to be conducted wholly within the natural sciences. This ambivalence is encouraged by Quine's ambiguous use of science, to mean sometimes, broadly, our presumed empirical knowledge and sometimes, narrowly, the natural sciences. Quine's modest naturalism is reformist, tackling the traditional epistemological problems in a novel (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Epistemic Value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The Trouble with Infinitism.Andrew D. Cling - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
    One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • La Naturalizzazione Dell'epistemologia. Contro Una Soluzione Quineana.Nicla Vassallo - 1997 - Franco Angeli.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On Nonfoundationalistic Theories of Epistemic Justification.Timo Airaksinen - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):403-412.
  • On Nonfoundationalistic Theories of Epistemic Justification.Timo Airaksinen - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):403-412.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Impure Infinitism and the Evil Demon Argument.Husein Inusah - 2016 - E-Logos 23 (1):13-24.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Meta-Epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):175-185.
    I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Foundationalism with Infinite Regresses of Probabilistic Support.William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3899-3917.
    There is a long-standing debate in epistemology on the structure of justification. Some recent work in formal epistemology promises to shed some new light on that debate. I have in mind here some recent work by David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, hereafter “A&P”, on infinite regresses of probabilistic support. A&P show that there are probability distributions defined over an infinite set of propositions {\ such that \ is probabilistically supported by \ for all i and \ has a high probability. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Prospects For Peircean Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-87.
    Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Mystical Experience and Non–Basically Justified Belief.Michael P. Levine - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (3):335 - 345.