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  1. An Internal Version of Epistemic Logic.Guillaume Aucher - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (1):1-22.
    Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is (...)
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  • Decision Theory, Intelligent Planning and Counterfactuals.Michael John Shaffer - 2008 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.
    The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are (...)
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  • A Reason Maintenance Perspective On Relevant Ramsey Conditionals.Haythem Ismail - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (4):508-529.
    This paper presents a Ramsey account of conditionals within the framework of an implemented reason maintenance system. The reason maintenance system is built on top of a deductive reasoning engine based on relevance logic. Thus, the account of conditionals provided is not susceptible to the fallacies of relevance. In addition, it is shown that independently motivated requirements on practical relevant reason maintenance allow us to gracefully circumvent Gärdenfors's triviality result.
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  • Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.Horacio Arló-Costa - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):3-28.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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  • Validity Beyond Measurement: Why Psychometric Validity Is Insufficient for Valid Psychotherapy Research.Femke L. Truijens, Shana Cornelis, Mattias Desmet, Melissa M. De Smet & Reitske Meganck - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):461-482.
    In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
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  • The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):461–482.
    In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
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