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  1. Memory and the Past.L. M. Mitias - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Hawaii at Manoa
    Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2008.
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  • McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):229-241.
    In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis (...)
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  • Mc Taggart and the Truth About Time.Heather Dyke - 2002 - In Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 137-.
    McTaggart famously argued that time is unreal. Today, almost no one agrees with his conclusion. But his argument remains the locus classicus for both the A-theory and the B-theory of time. I show how McTaggart’s argument provided the impetus for both of these opposing views of the nature of time. I also present and defend what I take to be the correct view of the nature of time.
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  • A Defeating Objection to Dynamic Block Theories of Time.Barry Lee - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):185-189.
    McTaggart's argument against the reality of the A series poses a serious problem for the moving-now block theory of time. A defender of MNBT can respond along lines suggested by Broad: by denying that we should understand ‘e was present’ as saying that e is present at some past moment t. There is, however, a serious—plausibly defeating—objection to this type of response: it implicitly denies a non-negotiable platitude about time. As a result, MNBT is not tenable. Growing block theories are (...)
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  • The Extent of the Present.William Craig - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):165 – 185.
    One of the principal objections to a tensed or dynamic theory of time is the ancient puzzle about the extent of the present. Three alternative conceptions of the extent of the present are considered: an instantaneous present, an atomic present, and a non-metrical present. The first conception is difficult to reconcile with the objectivity of temporal becoming posited by a dynamic theory of time. The second conception solves that problem, but only at the expense of making change discontinuous. The third (...)
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  • Mc Taggart and the Truth About Time.Heather Dyke - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:137-152.
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  • Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2001 - SATS 2 (2):60-79.
    I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is made explicit, (...)
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  • A-Theory for B-Theorists.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.
    The debate between A-theory and B-theory in the philosophy of time is a persistent one. It is not always clear, however, what the terms of this debate are. A-theorists are often lumped with a miscellaneous collection of heterodox doctrines: the view that only the present exists, that time flows relentlessly, or that presentness is a property (Williams 1996); that time passes, tense is unanalysable, or that earlier than and later than are defined in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity (Bigelow (...)
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  • Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
    Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based (...)
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  • McTaggart and Indexing the Copula.Bradley Rettler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):431-434.
    In this paper, I show how a solution to Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics is also a response to McTaggart’s argument that the A-series is incoherent. There are three strategies Lewis considers for solving the problem of temporary intrinsics: perdurantism, presentism, and property-indexing. William Lane Craig (Analysis 58(2):122–127, 1998) has examined how the three strategies fare with respect to McTaggart’s argument. The only viable solution Lewis considers to the problem of temporary intrinsics that also succeeds against McTaggart, Craig claims, is (...)
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  • Perceiving Multiple Locations in Time: A Phenomenological Defence of Tenseless Theory.Sean Enda Power - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):249-255.
    It is a common claim that one concept of time, tenseless theory, is in greater conflict with how the world seems to us than the competing theories of tense theory and presentism. This paper offers at least one counter-example to that claim. Here, it is argued that tenseless theory fares better than its competitors in capturing the phenomenology in particular cases of perception. These cases are where the visual phenomenology is of events occurring together which must be occurring at different (...)
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