Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Arguing From Molinism to Neo-Molinism.Elijah Hess - 2015 - Philosophia Christi 17 (2):331-351.
    In a pair of recent essays, William Lane Craig has argued that certain open theist understandings of the nature of the future are both semantically and modally confused. I argue that this is not the case and show that, if consistently observed, the customary semantics for counterfactuals Craig relies on not only undermine the validity of his complaint against the open theist, they actually support an argument for the openness position.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Future Contingents Are All False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):775-798.
    There is a familiar debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and ‘the present King of France’. According to the Strawsonian view, ‘The present King of France is bald’ is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply false. In this paper, I develop what I take to be a crucial connection between this debate and a different domain where bivalence has been at stake: future contingents. On the familiar ‘Aristotelian’ view, future contingent propositions are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Open Future Square of Opposition: A Defense.Elijah Hess - 2017 - Sophia 56 (4):573-587.
    This essay explores the validity of Gregory Boyd’s open theistic account of the nature of the future. In particular, it is an investigation into whether Boyd’s logical square of opposition for future contingents provides a model of reality for free will theists that can preserve both bivalence and a classical conception of omniscience. In what follows, I argue that it can.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.