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Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Mind 111 (442):386-388 (2002)

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  1. Latin American Philosophers: Some Recent Challenges to Their Intellectual Character.Susana Nuccetelli - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (2):121-135.
    For Latin American philosophers, the quality of their own philosophy is a recurrent issue. Why hasn’t it produced any internationally recognized figure, tradition, or movement? Why is it mostly unknown inside and outside Latin America? Although skeptical answers to these questions are not new, they have recently shifted to some critical-thinking competences and dispositions deemed necessary for successful philosophical theorizing. Latin American philosophers are said to lack, for example, originality in problem-solving, problem-making, argumentation, and to some extent, interpretation. Or does (...)
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  • The Time of Our Lives.David Hugh Mellor - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:45-59.
    The article shows how McTaggart’s distinction between A- and B-series ways of locating events in time prompted and enabled the twentieth century’s most important advances in the philosophy of time. It argues that, even if the B-series represents time as it really is, because having A-series beliefs when they are true is indispensable to the causation of timely action, the A-series represents ‘the time of our lives ’.
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  • Freedom of the Will and No-Self in Buddhism.Pujarini Das & Vineet Sahu - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (1):121-138.
    The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of the will, (...)
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  • L'arte, una specie di cosa?(Una schedatura parziale).Pietro Kobau - 2003 - Rivista di Estetica 23 (2):55-71.
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