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Tim Crane (2001). "The Paradox of Self-Consciousness" by José Luis Burmùdez. [REVIEW]

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  1.  7
    Me and I Are Not Friends, Just Aquaintances: On Thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...)
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  2.  14
    The Puzzle of Mirror Self-Recognition.Johannes Brandl - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):279-304.
  3.  8
    Is the Body Represented in Everyday Bodily Activities?Luis Alejandro Murillo Lara - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):591-604.
    There seem to be good reasons to think that there must be body representations or some kind of body content required for riding a bike or grabbing a cup of coffee. However, when I ride a bike or grab a cup of coffee, am I just representing the bike and the cup? Or am I actually also representing my body and bodily movements? The thesis of this paper is that the body not only figures in the content that guides everyday (...)
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  4.  4
    Ipseity at the Intersection of Phenomenology, Psychiatry and Philosophy of Mind: Are We Talking About the Same Thing?Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):689-701.
    In recent years, phenomenologically informed philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists have attempted to import philosophical notions associated with the self into the empirical study of pathological experience. In particular, so-called ipseity disturbances have been put forward as generative of symptoms of schizophrenia, and several attempts have been made to operationalize and measure kinds and degrees of ipseity disturbances in schizophrenia. However, we find that this work faces challenges caused by the fact that the notion of ipseity is used ambiguously, both in (...)
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  5.  16
    Co-Subjective Consciousness Constitutes Collectives.Michael Schmitz - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):137-160.
    In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – (...)
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  6.  15
    What is Reflective Self-Awareness For? Role Expectation for Situational Collaboration in Alliance Animal Society.Shanyang Zhao - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):187-209.
    Most research on animal self-awareness focuses on the question of what self-awareness is, however, the present study addresses the question of what self-awareness is for. It is argued that different forms of self-awareness are needed for conspecific collaboration in different types of animal societies. In the order of the increasing level of fluidity in conspecific cooperation, animal societies are divided into three main types: caste society, individualized society, and alliance society. Accordingly, three forms of self-awareness are differentiated: awareness of one’s (...)
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  7.  4
    Truth and Consciousness.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2017 - Human Studies 40 (4):663-679.
    Many work on flushing out what our consciousness means in cognitive and phenomenological terms, but no one has yet connected the dots on how consciousness and truth intersect, much less how our phenomenal consciousness can form the ground for most of our models of truth. Here, I connect those dots and argue that the basic structure of our phenomenal consciousness grounds the nature of truth as concordance, to harmonize in agreement, and that most extant theories on truth are well explained (...)
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  8.  10
    Personal Identity and Cosmopolitan Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1749-1760.
    Jonardon Ganeri’s The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance is a trailblazing study in cross-cultural philosophy of mind. Its liberal conception of naturalism makes room for a rich analytic taxonomy of conceptions of personal identity that go well beyond the standard models of Cartesianism, Physicalism, and Reductionism. But this naturalistically respectable model of the self must contend with the fact that the findings of the cognitive sciences are also compatible with ontological antirealism about the self. And while the book (...)
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  9.  7
    Facing the Mirror: A Relativist Account of Immune Nonconceptual Self-Representations.Jérémie Lafraire - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):140-160.
    There is a consensus among philosophers that some “I”-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. In some recent papers, this property has been formulated in the following deflationist way: an “I”-thought is immune to error through misidentification when it can misrepresent the mental or bodily property self-ascribed but cannot misrepresent the subject possessing that property. However, it has been put forward that the range of mental and bodily states that are immune in that limited sense cannot include nonconceptual forms of (...)
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  10.  38
    A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):425-442.
    In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...)
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  11. I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  12. A Self for the Body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
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  13.  41
    Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.
    This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state?content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ?state?content error error,? i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that (...)
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  14.  45
    Varieties of Visual Perspectives.David Bennett - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):329-352.
    One often hears it said that our visual-perceptual contact with the world is “perspectival.” But this can mean quite different things. Three different senses in which our visual contact with the world is “perspectival” are distinguished. The first involves the detection or representation of behaviorally important relations, holding between a perceiving subject and the world. These include time to contact, body-scaled size, egocentric position, and direction of heading. The second perspective becomes at least explicitly manifest in taking up the “proximal (...)
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  15.  48
    Desires and Practical Judgments in Action: Sergio Tenenbaum’s Scholastic View.Christine Tappolet - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):395.
    In his book Appearances of the Good, Sergio Tenenbaum has offered an impressive new defence of a classical account of practical reason, which marks him as heir to a philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle and Kant or, more recently, to Anscombe and Davidson. This account has come under heavy attack in the past twenty years, and it would be no exaggeration to say that it is now a minority view. This is at least so if one counts the number (...)
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  16.  80
    Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations.Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  17. Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems.Benny Shanon - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
    The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between mind and body, or nowadays - between mind or consciousness and the brain. As a relationship, this can be viewed from two perspectives: from body to mind and from mind to body. In this note I point out that the two readings of the problem are not symmetrical and that there are categorical differences between them. In particular, whereas the body to mind problem constitutes a mystery (cf. the contemporary hard problem), the mind (...)
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  18. Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  19.  44
    Conceptuality in Spatial Representations.Gottfried Vosgerau - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):349 – 365.
    The notion of conceptuality is still unclear and vague. I will present a definition of conceptual and nonconceptual representations that is grounded in different aspects of the representations’ structures. This definition is then used to interpret empirical results from human and animal navigation. It will be shown, that the distinction between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations can be matched onto the conceptual vs. nonconceptual distinction. The phenomena discussed in spatial navigation are thereby put into a wider context of cognitive abilities, (...)
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  20. Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
    . When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": the bluish aspect and the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character . What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character , of conscious experience? In this paper, I (...)
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  21.  5
    Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):133-162.
    Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.
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  22.  38
    La dynamique des intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):447-.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
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  23. Overintellectualizing the Mind.S. L. Hurley - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.
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