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Tim Crane (2000). The Origins of Qualia.

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  1.  15
    Cognitive Self-Management Requires the Phenomenal Registration of Intrinsic State Properties.Frederic Peters - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility, or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of representational content; and necessarily (...)
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  2.  25
    Experiencing Organisms: From Mineness to Subject of Experience.Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2447-2474.
    Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and (...)
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    Affect, Perceptual Experience, and Disclosure.Daniel Vanello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2125-2144.
    A prominent number of contemporary theories of emotional experience—understood as occurrent, phenomenally conscious episodes of emotions with an affective character that are evaluatively directed towards particular objects or states of affairs—are motivated by the claim that phenomenally conscious affective experience, when appropriate, grants us epistemic access not merely to features of the experience but also to features of the object of experience, namely its value. I call this the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. The aim of this (...)
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  4. Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.J. Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (...)
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  5.  36
    A Diet, but Not the Qualia Plan: Reply to Amy Kind.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):679-680.
  6.  96
    Quining Diet Qualia.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):667-676.
    This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The ‘classic’ conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down ‘diet’ conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. (...)
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